

## **FISCAL FEDERALISM IN INDIA: CONSTITUTIONAL AND EXTRA - CONSTITUTIONAL SENSIBILITIES**

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### ***Abstract***

*The fiscal federalism in India which is conditioned by both constitutional and extra-constitutional sensibilities is undergoing multiple strains in its working due to competitive bargaining of partisan politics emerged at the national politics, introduction of market rationality in the economy in the place of state rationality in development, and the persuasion of populist politics in contemporary India. The recurring demand for Special Category Status by several states for availing additional financial outlay, the declining resource capacity of the states due to the fiscal discipline imposed by the union government in the wake of market reforms, and the growing populist attitude of anti-institutionalism and anti-expertise knowledge have downsized the very spirit of fiscal federalism.*

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Federation is not only a political arrangement but also a social and economic contrivance for effective democratic governance. Politically, federalism checkmates tyranny of power and thereby strengthens democracy. Socially, federalism enlarges the participation of various communities and the protection of linguistic minorities and thereby deepening democracy. It is argued that federalism also creates and protects a political identity for certain communities and social groups (Feeley and Rubin, 2008). Federalism, in economic terms, devolves resources to various regions and thereby dislodges a sense of regional alienation of certain communities and bring them into the mainstream political discourse. Federalism in this respect

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is considered to be a 'safety valve' to ease the tension engulfed in the political system. These three dimensions of federalism- political, economic, and social –are coterminous which makes democracy more meaningful and publically alive.

Though India is not an ideal federation, it has many federal characteristics with more unitary features. The Constitution declares India as a Union of States based on the indestructible union of indestructible states. Indian federalism was created to accommodate politico-economic as well as the ethnocultural aspiration of people and it reflects the diversity, devolution, and authority. The nation-building process demanded a strong centre against the emergence of possible disruptive tendencies in the states. It was demanded that more control over public resources by the Union creates a strong centre that was essential for ensuring the unity and integrity of India. Unlike the western experiment of nation-state, India is often described as 'state-nation' where the state is engaging in building a nation. The creation of a strong centre was believed to be an apparatus to instill national feeling among the disaggregated population of India based on disparate social and political cleavages. Varshney asserts that "the debate in India's Constituent Assembly showed a fair degree of consensus on the subject of centralization" (Varshney, 2013: 50). In fact, Nehru and Ambedkar for various reasons favoured a fairly strong centre but never be too weaker states. The effect of partition may be one of the reasons for such consensus on a strong centre. In the newly drafted Constitution, in the division of powers between the centre based on Union List, State List, and the Concurrent List and in the residual powers (the items do not fall under these three lists) undue weight granted to the Centre viz. the states. Moreover, in the exercise of emergency powers – National Emergency, State Emergency, and Financial Emergency – the union government assumed greater powers.

Indian federalism is known for its asymmetric character as the federal set up is based on unequal powers and relations in political, administrative, fiscal, and ethical. The Constitution of India by powers creates a strong Union with a state with lesser powers which is legitimized for bringing national unity. Asymmetric Federalism (AF) was created to rectify certain problems in certain states with special provisions under the Fifth and Sixth Schedule of the Constitution – special provisions for tribal areas. Article 371 gives special powers to the north eastern states. Varshney argues that India's social diversities have taken four forms – caste, religion, language and tribe. Of these, language and tribe are territorially concentrated, and caste relations dispersed all over India. Since language and tribe are territorially concentrated, they became the mainstay of Indian federalism (Varshney, 2013: 44). In fact, the powerful linguistic cleavages contributed to the creation of the states, the federating units in India, while the powerful tribal cleavages demanded the establishment of Autonomous District Councils under the Fifth and Sixth Schedules. The constitution itself provides certain institutional and policy mechanisms to accommodate the growing amnesia of the ethnic communities. The extra-constitutional AF was to address certain grievances of the communities through institutional autonomy and fiscal allocation and integrating with the mainstream developmental states. In other words, this asymmetry is to address the tribal question in India and very much part of the five principles of tribal development proposed by Nehru and Verrier Elwin.

### **Fiscal Federalism and its Asymmetries**

Tracing back to the Government of India Act 1935, Fiscal Federalism (FF) in India, developed in the context of the active presence of a developmental state (DS) which is the storehouse of resources. DS envisages a strong centre with its capacity to control vast resources and a relatively smaller share of resources for state

government and, however, aims at a healthy fiscal relationship between central and state governments in India. FF is not merely seen as the transfer of financial powers between the Centre and states and the fiscal relations between the Federation and its units, but it involves larger redistributive politics. FF is created on a certain set of policies, institutions, and practices and to rectify the vertical and horizontal imbalances in the system of financial transfers. FF is not merely resource federalism, but it has a larger goal in democracy as it involves power-sharing. An effective and healthy federation depends on the share of resources to various state governments. Varshney explains that the resource transfers from Delhi to the states take place in implicit and explicit ways. The implicit transfers consist of subsidies, especially for food, fertilizers, and fuel; tax concessions for special economic zones, and subsidized loans to states from the central government or the banking system. The explicit mechanisms of transfer are three-fold devolution of taxes through Finance Commission, Grants and loans given by the Planning Commission for implementation of development plans; and transfers for various projects wholly funded by central government, or for the so-called centrally sponsored schemes, for which states typically bear a proportion of the cost. (Varshney, 2013: 51). FF envisages the decentralisation of state economic activity and seeks to bring financial autonomy to the state. It aims at redistribution of public goods at the local levels and economic welfare to the people through a set of sub-national governments. FF in India intends to achieve economic efficiency, distribution of public goods, and to bring regional (horizontal) equality. However, FF is a reflection of the existing political federation of a country and if there are imbalances in political, administrative, and ethnic federalism, it can be reflected in FF too.

The FF in India is often facing multiple challenges and some of them are constitutional and others are related to extra-constitutional.

### **1. Constitutional Asymmetries**

The Constitution of India is based on certain asymmetrical tilt which is reflected in political, administrative, and financial powers. Though the article 246 of the Constitution deals with the Division of powers based on the distribution of power in the form of Union List, State List, and Concurrent List, in most cases, the Union controls more legislative, executive, and financial powers. The basic means of financial transfer is through the institution called the Finance Commission (FC) under Article 280. It is a statutory institutional mechanism to oversee financial devolution to correct the vertical and horizontal imbalances. It gives recommendations on the distribution of tax revenue between the Union and states and amongst states themselves. It is argued that “the constitutional mechanism of the FC and the extra-constitutional mechanism of the Planning Commission, which was created by a resolution of the Government of India in March 1950, seek to address the problem of striking an equitable balance between the socio-economic growth of individual states and the disparity that exists between them” (Bhattacharjee, 2014: 49).

A healthy FF ensures fair and equitable devolution of fiscal resources from the center to the state. The FC supposed to monitor the transfer of resources between centre and states. For that it devises formula for the devolution of taxes and grants between the centre and state and recommends share of the state in central taxes along with non-plan grants. However, on many occasions, the concerns of the state were rarely addressed in the financial allocation and in many cases without consulting the states on the Terms of Reference. Again, the constitutional provisions, in fact, create centralization of government finances. This constitutional asymmetry created

vertical inequality between the centre and the states and horizontal asymmetries between the states. As a result, there is growing demand for greater financial transfers in the form of devolution of taxes to the state.

The equity in the transfer of resources between Union and the states and between the states constitute a politically contentious issue since the mid-1960s. In 1967 election witnessed the formation of many non-Congress governments at the state levels, which demanded political and financial autonomy from the Union government within the Constitutional framework. Prior to this since the Congress was in power both in the Centre and the states, most of the issues sorted out within the party forum. However, after 1967, there was growing conflict between various state governments and centre over-sharing tax revenues is due to arbitrary policy decisions over centralization. It was believed that the vertical fiscal imbalances are due to inequality in tax devolution and this would affect the health of the fiscal federalism in India. Moreover, the Centre uses the FC to promote its flagship programmes rarely the state government programmes. There is increasing fiscal imbalances in state budgets and the increasing fiscal deficit in the states adversely affect state spending in public services. This deteriorating revenues and increasing fiscal deficit in states create strains in FF in India. Moreover, taking population growth as criteria often ignore the southern state which saw an arrest in population growth. Often southern states are losing out from their fair share. For instance, the term of reference of the Fifteenth Finance Commission under N. K. Singh alleged biased against southern states. States worked for population control at a disadvantageous position as they are the potential losers in revenues. For instance, Bihar (25.1%), Chhattisgarh (22.6%), Jharkhand (22.3%), and AP – 11.1%.

## **2. Extra Constitutional Asymmetries**

The extra-constitutional asymmetries are emerged out of certain extra-constitutional provisions intended to arrest extremism and violence arising out of economic inequality in some states. Taking into account of certain specificities of the states the Union government grants Special Category Status (SCS). In broader terms, the creation of SCS is to end isolationism in development and to integrate with the developmental state. While special status empowers legislative and political rights, sometimes the SCS deals only with economic, administrative, and financial aspects. Under SCS the state governments get additional financial outlay from the Centre in the form of tax devolution and grants –in- aid. In SCS states, the Centre funds 90% of centrally funded schemes and the state government pays for only 10% to boost economic growth. In other state, the ration is (60:40). In 1969, the ideas of SCS were muted by the Fifth Finance Commission and initially, three states were granted the special category status- Assam, Nagaland, and J&K. Later eight more added that include Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Sikkim, Tripura, and Uttarkhand. Most states have inadequate resources due to their geographical terrain, tribal, and ethnocultural disparity. The SCS differs from the Special status provided to some states (like 370 to J& K earlier). The NDC sets five guidelines for the inclusion of a state in the SCS that include: hilly terrain; low population density or sizeable share of tribal population; strategic location along with border with neighbouring countries; economic and infrastructural backwardness; and non-viable nature of state finances. According to Bhattacharjee, these states have been “victims of the combined burden of history, geography, economic and governance. Even resources that nature has endowed them with could not be harnessed and utilized for their development due to the pathetic state of their infrastructure and its continued neglect

over decades” (Bhattacharjee, 2014: 48). It is estimated that all 11 states together get 30% of total central assistance according to the guidelines of the Gadgil-Mukherjee formula evolved in 1969. The formula determining the allocation of central assistance for state plans in India during the Fourth and Fifth Five Year Plans.

The Asymmetric Fiscal Federalism through extra-constitutional mechanism combined with asymmetric political federalism (through Fifth and Sixth Schedule) tried to address the political, economic, and ethnic anxieties of tribal and other ethnic communities in these states. Beyond the economic development of these states, the larger goal is to integrate these regions into the mainstream. The granting of SCS is usually seen as an extra-constitutional arrangement to address the problems of the development of the backwardness (Bhattacharjee, 2013: 17). It is argued that “the varieties of special status in the north-east are the closest India comes to de jure asymmetrical federalism” (Tillin, 2007: 56). It is argued that “even though the number of special state category states increased from only three in 1969 to 11 in 2001, its kitty of 30% of the central plan funds, after setting aside funds for externally aided projects and special area programmes in certain states, remained unchanged - there no proportionate increase in resources set out for this category as new states were added on” (Bhattacharjee, 2014: 53).

The extra-constitutional AF through granting SCS created further flux in the FF in India. Several states are demanding SCS get additional financial outlay from the Union government often turned to be a financial bargain articulated in party lines. Often the demand is politically motivated, political bargain and pressure work. Through which the state governments establish patronage politics. Best performing states often be sacrificed. It is subverting the federal system and attacking the very roots of the financial autonomy of the state. Growing demand from other states like Bihar (Bihar

was deprived of its rich natural resources with the formation of Jharkhand), Odisha (after the cyclone), Andhra Pradesh (after the formation of Telangana). In 2014, during the United Progressive Alliance government at the centre, when the bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh took place, the chief minister Chandrababu Naidu demanded SCS for the state. During the 2014 general election campaign, the BJP promised SCS to Andhra Pradesh, if coming to power and after coming to power at the centre it turned down the demand citing technical reasons leading to Telegu Desam Party's break away from the NDA. Irrked by the Union government's approach, the Members of Parliament from Andhra Pradesh protested in and outside the Parliament for SCS for the state rising regional sentiments. The state government justified the demand by saying that the state would be disadvantageous due to bifurcation as capital Hyderabad fling to the newly formed state of Telangana. Moreover, the state loses more revenues and resources due to bifurcation. The NDA government legitimized its action arguing that after adopting the recommendation of the Fourteenth Finance Commission (2015-20) chaired by YV Reddy, it scrapped the distinction between general and SCS. However, it added more woes to the most of the northeastern states were enjoying the SCS for several years now came under difficulty in mobilizing resources when the extra-constitutional mechanism is scrapping.

### **3. Political Cleavages and Competition**

Unlike other federalism elsewhere, FF in India is always coming under pressure from competitive demands and distributional pressure from political parties, social cleavages, and democratic compulsions. Since the Indian federalism is not built on modernity, the values of tradition influences on its working. The subnational demands, identity assertions are common for accessing their due share in development. In a competitive democracy with a competitive party



system, there is always pulls and pressures in accessing equal share in the national cake often lead to bargaining federalism. Theoretically and empirically argued that federalism in democracy undergoes many pulls and pressures, bitter bargaining for allocation of national resources. Democracy hampers resource allocation between the centre and states. Democracy involves intergovernmental bargaining over the allocation of national resources.

The changing nature of the party system influences fiscal federalism, India transformed from one-party dominance to coalition party system both at the states and centre which influence contrasting claims and bargains in Indian FF. As stated earlier, the emergence of regional parties in the states and their formation of governments at the state levels since 1967 added new dimensions to FF. Initial decades of independence, one party dominant system existed where both the Centre and most of the states were ruled by the Congress party. As a result, FF did not witness many strains. However, the Fourth General election in 1967 changed the situation, non-congress parties came to power. 1989 coalition governments at the centre. 2004 new political coalition emerged at the centre. The emergence of coalition regimes at the centre with the alliance of regional parties impacted FF in India.

The ascendancy of regional parties initially at the state level and later alliance with national parties at the centre made a great influence on the FF in India. As a result, some states acquired more bargaining power with the Centre in resource allocation. States are the immediate relations with the people that affect democratic redistribution. As Rao says that “with the polarization of political parties and competitive relationships between the centre and many of the states, both vertical and horizontal conflicting relationships have changed” (Rao, 2007:173). Since the 1990s, the participation of regional parties in national coalitions and their increasing bargain

power for demanding more resources for their states added a new dimension to FF. Perhaps, one of the pertinent challenges to FF in India is the eluding political consensus on Fiscal Issues. Rao argues that “the coalition of disparate parties with differing ideologies makes it difficult to forge consensus on major policy issues” (Rao, 2007:173). The democratic regimes based on competitive party systems are often driven by the ballot box theory of public expenditure which believes that more spending on public expenditure by the government would be rewarded for the ruling party at the time of elections. In other words, more public expenditure means more votes to the party in power. Even a government that takes rigorous fiscal discipline founded to be more popular in resource allocation during the election. Chhibber found that in the 1990s central governments’ food subsidies are higher in election years than in non-election years (Chhibber, 1995: 74-96).

#### **4. Neoliberal Market Rationality**

In the 1990s, India witnessed the transformation of its command economy to market economy bringing changes in various sectors. Economic reforms not only led to the shrinking resource capacity of the state but also undermine the developmental nationalism. As a result, not only the fiscal policies and institutions transformed, the market principles emerged as the guiding principles of resource allocation. Though economic reforms lifted India to impressive economic growth however states income reduced due to the deterioration of state finances. As Rao argues that “stagnant revenues on the one hand, and increasing expenditures on account of pay revision, subsidies, and interest payments on the others, have resulted in bulging current budgetary deficits and fiscal deficits, with the latter contributing to increase in the debt burden of the states” (Rao, 2007:160). The growing role of the market is adversely affecting the state financial outlays and the central allocation. This neoliberal

market rationality in fact created new financial governmentality where the state resource capacity is eroded and fiscal autonomy under risk. The market rationality not only undermines the concerns of the states in fiscal allocation which contributed to an increasing fiscal deficit at the state level. Rao asserts that “some of the challenges faced in Indian fiscal federalism arise from the inherent shortcomings of the system. One such problem arises from the steady deterioration in the fiscal health of the states” (Rao, 2007:170). The shrinking resource capacity of the state accelerated more demand for financial outlay from the Union, in the form of special packages for the states to tide over the fiscal troubles. The liberalisation of imports and relaxing regulatory mechanisms impacted in revenues. The free trade agreements signed by the Union government adversely affected the economies of various states. The imposition of fiscal austerity on the states created public discontent on its governments as they are more close to the people than the centre. In the 1990s, when the Central government vigorously carried out neoliberal policies and curtail social safety programmes. The expenditure on education and health drastically reduced leading to more federal bargaining over resources as the vulnerability of states in finances. The state government adopted competitive populism at the state levels to expand their political constituency.

The economic liberalization, in its second generation, extended to the state levels as various states got autonomy in attracting investment for their states. The global investment meets by various state governments to attract investment for their states, state direct engagement with forging capital, and foreign visit of chief ministers for wooing investment for their states gave a new turn to the economic opportunities for the states. The increasing horizontal competition between states for attracting foreign investment puts the FF under risk. However, this also accelerated interstate and

intrastate equality as the foreign investors and capital preferred only some states and some regions leading further asymmetry in FF. It is argued that “the adoption of market-oriented reforms in 1991 brought the contradictions between the functioning of markets and the centralized finance system” (Rao, 2007: 152). As state governments engage in many public utility services and welfare schemes faced many resources constraints due to cut in developmental expenditure due to fiscal discipline. However, the opportunities brought by the market were utilized by the developed states and the underdeveloped left out. Most states faced a competitive challenge from economic liberalization. It is further argued that “the SEZs have overwhelmingly arisen in the industrially advanced states in India, including Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and Haryana, which account for nearly 80% of all formal approvals” (Ananthanarayanan, 2008: 44).

## **5. Populist Persuasions and Emotional Mobilization**

Along with market rationality, the current spurt of populist persuasions and emotional political mobilization have a direct bearing on the FF in India. It has to be reminded that FF critically depends on a set of institutions and expertise knowledge. In a federal system, institutional structure plays an important role and institutional mechanism to monitor the financial transfer which is essential to fiscal democracy. In other words, federalism is an institutional mechanism in a democracy to ensure governance. Subrata K. Mitra asserts that “a federal system is the constitutional arrangement that gives federalism in its institutional form” (Mitra, 2000: 39). However, populist regimes are based on anti-elitism, anti-institutions, anti-experts, anti-data, anti-immigrant, and often anti-establishment. Populist regimes are considered to be anti-institutional as it believes that an individual appeal directly reaches out the people and ensure their welfare. The populist persuasions in politics bring the crisis

of financial institutions and the legitimacy of these institutions are under disarray. The populist persuasions in politics are directed against the constitutional and extra-constitutional mechanism which was perhaps more manifested in the dismantling of the Planning Commission, a non-statutory body to oversee resource outlay. While institutions like the Planning Commission came under attack from the populist regimes, the other opposite view was that it failed to capture the new economic realities of India. As Y V Reddy argues that "the origins of NTTI Aayog could be traced to the discontent with the Planning Commission on two important fronts, viz., the perception that it was not able to capture what has been described as the new realities of macro-economic management at the national level, and it has not been conducive to sound fiscal relations between the Union and the States" (Reddy, 2018: 2).

Secondly, populism shows anti-data approach. In fact, the strength and weaknesses of FF can be analysed using data gathered in various fields. Economic data is important for measuring the health of FF that includes both qualitative and quantitative data. Data is also essential for measuring GDP and growth in various sectors of the economy. Economic data on jobs, poverty, health, unemployment, inflation, consumer price are determining factors of the financial health of the country. Thirdly, populism believes that a single leader can solve all problems of people through direct contact with the people without institutional intermediaries and often through emotion politics. In many cases, elections are fought under the image of the national leader, not the state chief ministers and leaders. The anti-incumbency due to the poor implementation of welfare policies at the state level is often overcome by the populist construction of image of the national leader. Thus, populism develops more centralization of financial powers and thereby destroys the vitality of FF.

## Conclusion

The FF in India has undergone many ups and downs in the last seven decades. The framers of the constitution while giving overwhelming power to the Union government in matters related to political, administrative, and economic powers because of national unity and integration, were challenged by the emergence of regional political forces in the late 1960s. The regional parties which came to power in various states after dislodging the hegemony of the Congress at state levels demanded more financial resources and autonomy from the Union. As a result, the Indian FF often becomes the victims of both vertical conflicts and horizontal conflicts. Though institutions such as the National Development Council (NDC) and Interstate Councils can resolve such conflicts, seemed to be failed in its responsibilities. Though initially the demands of the states were suspiciously viewed as antithetical to national unity, the growing realization that the health of FF depends on the financial well being of the states. In the late eighties and nineties, the regional parties became the part of the national coalitions, the political bargain for additional financial outlay assumed different connotations. When the fiscal discipline in the wake of market reforms eroded the resource capacity of the states, more demands for additional resources to meet development expenditure. In the recent past, the populist onslaught on institutions and expertise knowledge further generated strains in the sustainability of FF. To conclude, the strains in the FF in India derive from both constitutional and extra-constitutional sensibilities that developed over some time.

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## OUTSIDE THE NORM: SIDDHASAMAJAM AND THE QUESTION OF SOCIAL MODERNISATION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY KERALA

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### Abstract

*This paper is drawn from the observation of an unclassified file found at the Regional Archives at Calicut. It speaks of a dispute between the Siddhasamajam and the local population over the question of access to the bathing pond of Lokanarkavu situated in the Malabar province under the British Presidency in 1930. The author conducts an excursion into the intellectual universe of Swami Sivananda, the founder of Siddhasamajam to understand the formative influences that contributed to the formulation of his doctrines. Sivananda developed a critique of the process of modernisation being unravelled around him. The nostalgic attitude towards the good practices of the pre modern era inspired him to reinvent an experimental society which is expected to fight the evil effects of modernity.*

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Key Words: *Siddhasamajam, Samajist, Modernisation, savarna, siddhavidya*

The paper originates from an unclassified file found at the Regional Archives at Calicut<sup>1</sup>. The file speaks of a dispute between the Siddhasamajam<sup>2</sup> and the local population over the question of access to the bathing pond of Lokanarkavu<sup>3</sup> situated in a remote village near Badagara, Calicut, in the Malabar province under the British Presidency in 1930. Disputes over access to public spaces (Panikkar, 2016) between low and high caste groups were a constant phenomenon in colonial and post-independent India. As lower castes increasingly attempted to overcome social stigma by violating

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the limits set on their social mobility and access to public spaces, disputes over caste identity and religious conversion became a matter of concern for a long time in Twentieth century India. The particular case under discussion, that reached the office of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, however, raises a series of questions that goes beyond the issue of caste conflicts and religious conversions. Deviating from the general pattern of conflicts between castes, the dispute in this case was a quarrel between Siddhasamajam, a social organisation that emerged in Malabar during the early decades of twentieth century and the local population of a little hamlet near Badagara in Calicut consisting largely of the high caste Nairs which was also supported by a large section of the Thiyyas, a former outcaste, whose social status itself at that point of time was forcefully negotiated, within the changing socio-religious contexts.

Wedded to the idea of modernity as rational and free individuals, the samajam was polemic in their criticism of the social institutions as encroaching on the freedom of the individual and pledged to create a society free from all such bondages (Sivananda,1990). The membership of the samajam was therefore opened up to all, irrespective of caste, which in itself was quite novel as we hardly witness any practical attempts at creating a social life which incorporated even the lowest among the hierarchy of castes in Kerala, though the call for such a unification was raised by many. Yet, discrimination based on caste was just one element in the broad spectrum of social engineering that the samajam attempted. More radical was their engagement with the question of marriage, family and social ties (Sivananda,1987). The members of the samajam were against the very idea of marriage and engaged in sexual relations as free individuals. The children born out of such relations were separated from the biological mothers and were raised by the samajam as free individuals without any familial bonds.

In the newly constituted social domain of the twentieth century Kerala the status of such a community of individuals became a debatable question as they came in confrontation not just against the norms that stained the 'traditional' but even with those was imagined as 'modern' (Mundon,2000). In the late July of the year 1930, members of the samajam decided to violate caste norms by collectively taking bath in the pond of the famous Lokanarkavu temple near Badagara as the right to taking bath in the pond was restricted to the savarna castes alone (Court Proceedings op.cit). As seen elsewhere the local population objected to the move on the ground that the identity and status based on caste did not necessarily change due to the fact that the lower caste had joined the samajam. For them the samajam itself had become degraded for the fact that it had incorporated the lower castes within its fold. The second reason for the samajam being despised was for the fact that the way of life and the practices followed by the members of the samajam was considered as a threat to the renewed perception of the modern social life that was to be restructured within the indigenous social life. In this particular case, while on the one hand the lower castes were to retain their identity as the marginalized, the samajam was also to be despised of being outside the boundaries of the modern social life set by the new norms of family and sexual /moral norms (Mundon,2003).

Conventional historiographical enquiries on the nature of caste and social mobilisation in India have placed the lower and higher castes as two different entities which tends to argue that the attempts to reform was basically guided by attempts to gain access to spaces that were hitherto denied to the lower castes (Chandramohan,2016). Far from being a conflict between caste groups this issue raises deeper questions on the nature of nineteenth century caste mobilisation and social acceleration in India in general and Kerala in particular.

Further, this also draws our attention to the pressing need to relook at the limits and character of the reform movements initiated by caste groups in India. This forces us to raise questions on the very idea of reform and the need to disentangle the multiple layers of the value system of the traditional social elite shared in common with the norms and values of modern day social life and the transformation that occurred from one set of moral values to another and the ways in which notions of exclusion and inclusion are articulated in modern social life. This paper is an attempt at this direction.

The case occurred when the samajists collectively decided to violate the existing norm relating to taking bath in the above said pond. The samajists took it as a denial of access to a public space and their action leading to the intervention of the colonial government. On the other hand the local population resolved to resist the move. On their part the samajists preferred a judicial resolution and decided to do the act peacefully and democratically. When they moved towards the pond to take bath the local population assembled there severely beaten up the samajists to disperse them inviting the governmental intervention. Finally the case was disposed by a court in 1931 which protected the demand of the samajists (Court Proceedings op.cit). At one level the verdict can be treated as a successful upholding of the equal right of access to a public space. What remains to be unexplored is the reason for the occurrence of the event. Both the parties involved in the case were to be considered as reformed entities of the twentieth century. The demand put forward was also justifiable from a modern perspective. Still the local population was not prepared to extend this right to the samajists. The rationale of this reluctance seems to be the perspective of the local people in relation to the samajists. They believed that by admitting lower caste men to the samajam, the samajam itself had got downgraded to the status of a lower caste. Hence, the local population refused to entertain the demand of the samajists.

This brings forth some of the unexplored areas of the reform discourse of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The perspective of the samajam in terms of the existing social issues brought it in conflict with the classified reform movements. An uncompromising attitude towards caste observances and a critique of the brahminical world view was central to the thought of Swami Sivananda the founder of the Siddha samajam. In his 'Keralanacharam' (Sivananda, 1993) he sketches the Brahmin as cruel and insensitive who tries to impose his own interests upon others through various means and in the name of religion. Other caste groups like Nairs and Thiyyas obey his orders uncritically. He went to the extent of challenging the status of water used as a purificatory agent. He holds that water in the pond is impure as all the filthy objects available in the areas around the pond are carried to the pond during monsoon. The Brahmins and other upper castes take a dip in this water to make them pure. Moreover, purification of the body is necessitated by their contact with defiling agents. Through the dip in water the impurities of the body get dissolved in water. Thus, the water in the pond remains impure permanently. How can this water make the body ritually pure is the argument of Sivananda. His discourse creates the impossibility of remaining ritually pure in early twentieth century Kerala. In addition to this he argues that the ritually and socially marginalised sections of society as pure and perfect individuals (Mundon, 2000). This is a radical position in relation to the process of social modernisation of Kerala which turns indigestible to the traditionalists as well as to the modernists.

Another aspect of the social engineering process conceived of by the Siddha samajam is its position against the married life. The samajam disapproved of the social arrangement of marriages and that of the nuclear families. The ideal institution for them was a corporate living of all human beings enjoying equal rights irrespective

of differences based on caste creed or religion (Sivananda,1993). They counted only biological differences that is between men and women and imposed certain rules and regulations upon the inmates. The inmates were permitted to wear only white clothes. But at the time of japam (practice of sidhavidya) (Sivananda,1987) all of them were to attend it fully naked. At the same time precautions are also taken to avoid any slippage into sexual anarchy. Moreover, he believes that wearing of dresses and ornamentation makes men and women lustful leading to the degeneration of human essence and dying out of Jeeva. The insistence upon wearing of minimum dress was justified also on health grounds. He states that wearing of dress leads to the blocking of natural air reaching the body, leading, in turn, to skin diseases. He argues that the healthy existence of aged men around us was due to their non-wearing of shirts and hard work and living in harmony with nature. Some dietary restrictions are also imposed upon the inmates. The food prescribed for them is a mixed one of rice and grams which was to be taken together from the same vessel. The samajam identified the selfish motive of the individual to protect the interest of the family as the driving force of modernity (Lawrence,1996). Hence, the life in the samajam was regulated as an attempt to resist the slippage into a desirous modern individual who is after the enjoyment of worldly pleasures in the name of improving the standard of living.

Their notions on sex relations seemed too radical to be followed by the larger society. They never allowed a married life within the samajam and there was restrictions to private property. But there was no bar on entering into sexual relationships between the male and female members based on bilateral agreements. Sexual relationships were regulated by an emphasis on mutual consent in such relationships (Mundon,2003).. Dissociating from the existing norms on sex and familial relations the samajam attached more

importance to the individual impulse in such acts. It recognised the autonomous right and responsibility of both the sexes over their actions and especially the ability of women in decision making. It had separated sex from its status as a component of the familial arrangement to the status primarily as a biological act. Thus, the samajam was trying to liberate their women folk from the status of a passive victim of men's sexual aggression to that of an active agent in the sexual act. Pregnancy, fatherhood and delivery was not a matter of concern for the ladies in the samajam. New born babies were separated from their mothers soon after delivery and were taken care of by the samajam. Rearing the children was considered the collective responsibility of the whole community. Children addressed all male inmates as father and grandfather according to the age of the person. Similarly, all female inmates are addressed as mothers and grandmothers by the children.

This notion of sex and corporate living in the samajam resonates with the notions of Marx and Engels on family and private property. This notion has to be treated as an attempt to liberate women from the status as mere 'instrument of production' that exist in a class society as observed by Frederick Engels (Smith,1997). The male female relation within the samajam is as natural and direct as to flourish healthy and uninhibited person to person relationship. It, therefore, reveals the extent to which man's natural behaviour has become human or the extent to which the human essence in him has become his natural essence'. We fail to find any class demarcation between productive and reproductive spheres within the samajam. The sexual division of labour in class society is considered mainly responsible for the erosion of equality between sexes. This happened, in the words of Engels, due to 'the overthrow of mother right which was rightly regarded as 'the world historic defeat of the female sex'. This led to the emergence of the intermediate form of the

patriarchal family followed by monogamy which developed rapidly following the overthrow of mother right. Monogamy appears to be 'the subjection of one sex by the other as the proclamation of a conflict between the sexes entirely unknown in the prehistoric times'. This social transformation came into existence as a result of the nature of productive work emerged at that time. All productive work at that time occurred away from the household and, hence, household became exclusively a sphere primarily intended for reproduction. This helps us to situate the practices at the samajam as the re-enactment of the primitive stage where unrestricted sexual freedom prevailed within the tribe, every woman belonging equally to every man and every man to every woman (Hansen & Sewell, 2012).

In this context, it seems to be worthwhile to conduct an excursion into the intellectual universe of Swami Sivananda to understand the formative influences that contributed to the formulation of his doctrines. It is interesting to note that the Siddhasamajam was founded at a time when the literature on Marxism was yet to gain ground in Kerala. In 1913 the biography of Karl Marx was published in Malayalam by Swadeshabhimani K. Ramakrishna Pillai (Pillai, 1946). Most of the literature on Marxism reached Kerala in the 1930s. This rules out the possibility of a Marxist influence upon Swami Sivananda, the founder of the samajam. The early anthropologists who studied Indian social organisation emphasized the existence of matrilineal communities among the Indian population (Mencher, 1993). Under colonialism it transformed into patriarchal societies leading to the creation of lustful individuals and a process of dehumanization. He addressed this process of dehumanization of individuals in his writings. He developed a critique of the process of modernisation being unravelled around him. The nostalgic attitude towards the good practices of the pre

modern era inspired him to reinvent an experimental society which is expected to fight the evil effects of modernity (Jones, 1999). This understanding helps us to situate the samajam as a unique contribution of Swami Sivananda. It is not the success or failure that make the experiment unique but the critique of the existing society as well as the novelty of the experiment.

## Notes

*Proceedings of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Calicut dt. 30th July. M.No. 155/31 Unclassified file.*

*The Siddhasamajam was founded by Swami Sivananda Paramahansa at Vatakara in the Calicut district of Kerala.*

*Lokanarkavu is a hindu temple situated towards the east of Vatakara. Attached to the temple was a pond to be used by the upper caste devotees which became the site of the clash between the samajists and the local population.*

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## AFGHANISTAN AS THE 'NEW KASHMIR' IN INDIA - PAKISTAN ADVERSARIAL RELATIONSHIP: AN ANALYSIS

Vinny Ponnath\*

### Abstract

*India and Pakistan who began their journey in 1947 have given no rest to their conflicting relation till date. Rather, as inborn rivals, their conflicting interests and policies have assumed further heights in the Hindukush ranges of Afghanistan. India fears the growth and spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan and its eventual extension to India which could pose a threat to her internal security as it has happened in Kashmir. The installation of any pro- Pakistan dispensation in Afghanistan in the changing dynamics is a security threat to India. Pakistan fears India's domination of the region as a security threat. Pakistan has been frequently employing the coercive instrument of terrorism and proxy war to sabotage Indian interests in Kashmir and in the larger Af-Pak region. In the last two decades, like Kashmir, Afghanistan has been a site of intensive Indo-Pak rivalry and security concern. The policies of both India and Pakistan towards Kashmir and Afghanistan are linked each other. This paper analyses how the conflicting interests of India and Pakistan in Afghanistan transforms it as a 'new Kashmir' in terms of security threats in the context of increased use of proxy wars by Pakistan against India*

### Introduction

Afghanistan has been a rival factor between India and Pakistan since the birth of the two countries. Recent developments compelled many scholars to consider it as the 'new Kashmir' because since 9/11, Indo-Pak rivalry has been best reflected in Afghanistan more

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than that in the Kashmir. Since the Cold War, Indian assistance to Afghanistan could be seen in diverse sectors like economic, military and cultural, and thereby India has achieved a lot of advantages over Pakistan. (Felbab-Brown, 2015) When USSR invaded Afghanistan in the late 1970's India sided with the USSR and Pakistan was in support of anti-Soviet US forces. The end of the cold war created a new history in Afghanistan too. The civil war broke out after the Soviet withdrawal, came to an end by raising Taliban into the power center. When Pakistan supported this Pashtun Taliban, India was on its hostile side, along with Northern Alliance which was in war with the Taliban government. Like Kashmir, the interests of India and Pakistan in Afghanistan have been on the opposing poles since the birth of these countries. In this backdrop, this paper analyses how the use of proxy means of Islamic terrorism by Pakistan in Afghanistan creates a Kashmir like security threat to India.

In this paper the discussion is set in five parts. The first part discusses the perspective which is used to connect the Afghanistan scenario to that of Kashmir in India. In the second part conflicting interests of India and Pakistan are detailed which is followed by Indo-Pak rivalry and increased use of terrorism and proxy war by Pakistan against India in Afghanistan. In the fourth section the recent developments of peace talks, subsequent Doha agreement and its implications to the Indo-Pak rivalry in Kashmir and Afghanistan are elaborated. Fifthly, an analysis is made on how Afghanistan has become a 'new Kashmir' which is followed by conclusion.

### **The Kashmir Connect to Afghanistan Security Imbroglio**

Kashmir is the vertebra of troubles existing between India and Pakistan since the infancy of them which never allowed a peace sleep in the border areas. The conflict over Kashmir began with the first

Indo-Pak war in 1947. A UN sponsored ceasefire has ended the war by providing a perpetual conflicting boundary between India and Pakistan which divided Kashmir into two which is later popularly known as Line of Control (LoC). There after two major wars and one minor war fought between India and Pakistan with the exception of one, all others, for the Kashmir cause. In all these wars Pakistan realized the unchallengeable Indian force strength which provoked her to use proxies against India. In order to equalize Pakistan's military strength to that of India, she considers the use of terrorism as the best means economically politically and strategically. (Chawla, 2020) Since 1947 Pakistan used her covert war strategy against India where the methods and strategic tools have been gradually developing during the course of time.

Pakistan has made an intelligence work during 1950's to downfall the Indian military force's superiority by sabotaging the Indian military. She has adopted the policy of 'bleed India' through the promotion of proxy war against India and thinks it as the best possible technique to undermine and demoralize the strength of India. (Raman, 2013) Pakistan finds it very cost effective because she has to bear nothing towards the military development and at the same time very effective in making injury to the Indian force. Pakistan's ISI considers any damage to Indian military as addition of two extra divisions to Pakistan's army at zero cost. (Raman, 2013) 'Offensive defense' was a weapon used by her against India for all these decades. (Chawla, 2020) For several decades, India has also been blaming Pakistan for her emphatic support for the promotion of separatist militants against India in Kashmir. ([www.bbc.com](http://www.bbc.com), 2019)

Continuous efforts were made by Pakistan to handicap Indian army through the promotion of insurgency and terrorism against India and thereby she was able to squeeze more energy of India

towards counter terrorism activities. (Raman, 2013) Increased use of proxy wars has been started to use against India since Gen. Zia-ul-Haq captured power in Pakistan. In the 1980's, the demise of charismatic leader of Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah, followed by the rigging of 1987 election and the Pakistan intelligent's support to the JKLF (Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front) together caused the beginning point of the remarkable trend towards anti-Indian Islamic Militant operations in Kashmir. (EFSAS, 2017) Pakistan's vigorous role in the furtherance of back channel militancy against Indian security system in effect made hefty loss to India economically and politically. Initially Pakistan has extended only moral and diplomatic support to the militants fighting India in the Kashmir valley, but in the due course it has embraced all aspects including military supply to these growing groups.

The experience she acquired from Afghan war in the 1980's in the tactics of guerilla warfare and in the usage of modern arms and ammunition was effectively applied against India in Kashmir by Pakistan. (EFSAS, 2017) The enormous presence of religious factions and their politics of violence have diverted the political face of Kashmir into religious and communal level. It is at this point, Afghanistan could be equated with that of Kashmir. Like Kashmir, India and Pakistan have equal stakes in Afghanistan that too specifically after the 9/11 geo-political setting.

Both Kashmir and Afghanistan linger as bone of contention between India and Pakistan at territorial and geostrategic level respectively. The 9/11 re-opens before India a fortuity to regain her lost ties with Afghanistan where they have equal strategic competence. In this context also the devious Pakistan does have no second thought in employing her strategic weapon (insurgency) against India. The success of Indian soft strategy in Afghanistan is

believed by Pakistan as unchallengeable for her which again drive her to make use of 'bleed India' strategy beyond the territorial borders. By upholding anti-Indian insurgents in Afghanistan, Pakistan aspires to choke Indian development assistance to the people and projects and thereby thwart India from enjoying the geo-strategic advantage in Afghanistan.

As it is seen in Kashmir, in this case also, it was during the Zia-ul-Haq's regime in Pakistan, 'religion' is diagnosed as an effective weapon against Indian strategy. (Wagner, 2010, p. 249) The billions of assistance received from USA for training the anti-Soviet forces has become a great blessing for Pakistan to recognize her strategic asset (terrorism) against India. This period marked the beginning of both Pakistan's strategic sprout in Afghanistan and inflated use of proxy war technique against Kashmir territory in India. Afghanistan has been used as an anti-Indian training ground by Pakistan since the Soviet withdrawal period. (Kaura, 2017, p. 30) During the Taliban regime (brain child of Pakistan) Afghanistan has been transformed into a hub of Islamic terrorism (especially against India) under the supervision and sponsorship of Inter Services Intelligence. (Abhyankar, 2015, p. 373)

In the tireless competition to get the pivot of Afghanistan, Pakistan has been increasingly affixing the method and strategy of proxy war. Terrorism and proxy war have turned out as her authoritative foreign policy perspective towards India. She finds it successful in using the religious capsules to undermine Indian morale. To gain strategic mileage against India in Afghanistan, she adopted all the techniques used in Kashmir. The following discussion throws more light on this Kashmir connect in Afghanistan.

### **Conflicting Interests of India and Pakistan in Afghanistan**

The antagonistic interests of India and Pakistan in Afghanistan can be traced back to the birth of the two countries. Since 1947, Afghanistan has been a conflicting factor between them similar to that of Kashmir. Against cold war politics and Pakistan's alliance towards America, India and Afghanistan became closer to each other. (Pant, 2013, p.106) The British drawn Durand line was a major conflicting factor between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This artificial boundary divided the same ethnic Pashtun population under two nationalist territories. The rivalry over the Pashtunistan was a dominant issue in the bilateral relations between the two. On the other side India and Pakistan were quarrelling over the Kashmir issue. These two border issues tied India and Afghanistan together against Pakistan in the first four decades after independence. The Soviet invasion and subsequent developments in Afghanistan created an ideal ground for Pakistan's entry in the land. Thereafter, since the mid of 1990's Pakistan 'managed' Taliban government gave her strategic depth in Afghanistan. A decade since 1990 witnessed strained Indo-Afghan relation. But the 9/11 incident and the consequent developments including the fall of Taliban government opened new doors for Indian entry to Afghanistan.

Indian interests and assistance in Afghanistan is determined, mainly based on the forthcoming security challenges in Afghanistan. Religious extremism and terrorism are the two major threats against India in the region, that too, India believes that, sponsoring from Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas. Hence transformation of Afghanistan into an anti-insurgent land is the key challenge before India, especially in the context when Pakistan has been utilizing Afghanistan for the promotion of anti-Indian forces. This, along with other economic, cultural and strategic factors determines

Indian objectives in Afghanistan.

Evacuation of anti-India terrorist groups from Afghanistan is given the top position in the priority list of India in Afghanistan which she thinks, is possible only under a non-Taliban regime. Taliban is believed as the brain child of Pakistan and to a great extent, supports the interests of Pakistan within and beyond the land. If Taliban again comes to occupy the government seats, India may further lose her budding diplomatic ties in Afghanistan. Also it will provide a fertile soil for Pakistan to sow the seeds of anti-Indian terrorism. This growth of Islamic insurgency will have direct impact up on the Kashmir and peace will be remained as an unattainable goal for this region. Again India is exposed to multifaceted security threats due to the cross border drug trafficking which is also rooted in Afghanistan. The black money and illegal market of opium and poppy created a lot of economic and social issues in India. The intensity of this illegal drug trafficking to India has been raised to 64 percent under the Taliban regime and it is reported to have declined to the level of 5 percent by 2002. (Sharma, 2009, p. 2) (Javaid & Aslam, 2016, p. 671) It was one of the major reasons for India's estranged relation with the Taliban (It was through this source Taliban found its financial base). India always aims to have a democratic government, representing the diverse and plural nature of Afghanistan and believes that only such an all embracing government could stabilize the fractured state. (Mukhopadhyaya, 2010, pp. 28-29) India also wanted to have a pro-Indian government there.

Only a pro-Indian and friendly regime in Afghanistan could bring about Indian objective to extend her relations to the Central Asian states. The 2011, world fact book by CIA recorded that, by 2030, in order to meet 80 percent of Indian fuel needs, she will have to depend upon imports. (Hanauer & Chalk, 2012, p. 12)

(Sharma, 2009, p. 2) The major part of this could be fulfilled by India, if she is able to strengthen her relations with Central Asian Republics. India has already taken such initiative for strengthening the relations. For the modernization of a hydropower plant in Tajikistan, India has given \$17 million. (Javaid & Aslam, 2016, p. 675) Here Afghanistan is regarded as a strategic bridge for India to attach her to Central Asia. From the proposed TAPI pipeline project (1000 mile, \$7.6 billion Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline), it was reported that "India and Pakistan would receive 14 bcm/y each, representing 1.5 percent of India's total annual energy consumption and 15 percent of Pakistan's." (Hanauer & Chalk, 2012, p. 12) For the safe and easy movement of the gas pipeline from Central Asia to Pakistan and India, an insurgent free, strong and stable Afghanistan is a prerequisite. Also the abundance of mineral resources of iron, gold, cobalt, copper, etc, in Afghanistan is considered as India's interest areas in this territorial entity. (Javaid & Aslam, 2016, p. 672)

Afghanistan also provides a platform for India to show her potential and strength to become a regional and extra regional power. India can expose her military strength in this respect. India's military base in Tajikistan has been using as a potential tool to show her strength in the region; it is by using this base, Indian humanitarian assistance and various other constructive requirements were transported to Afghanistan. (Hanauer & Chalk, 2012, p. 13) It also provides a platform for India to project her military strength into Central Asia. In order to protect Indian lives and interests in Afghanistan, certain Indian forces, especially para-military forces are set up in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is considered by many as a test ground of Indian ambitions to become a regional and world power.

Even though, India won the three wars with Pakistan, she is

always concerned about the future threat to be posed by Pakistan. Also, there is ambiguity regarding the strategy of Afghanistan in this respect. So India needs to be very careful in taking her policy perspectives towards these countries. Sripathi Narayanan who was a great scholar and consultant to the Ministry of External Affairs of India put it that "the key to the Afghan conflict lies in Pakistan, which has the biggest stake and influence in the Afghan conflict." (Narayanan, 2010) Pakistan always sees India with a suspicious mind. India is frequently criticized by Pakistan as promoting the anti-Pakistan Baluchi extremism. Pakistan believes that Indian embassy in Kabul and her four consulates are functioning as anti-Pakistan missions in Afghanistan. (Javaid & Aslam, 2016, p. 672) Any Indian touch in Afghanistan has been creating irritation for Pakistan and hence she promotes radical forces against India. It is at this backdrop Pakistan's objectives in Afghanistan are to be analyzed.

Since the installation of the Taliban government, Afghanistan is regarded by Pakistan as her strategic weapon against India. The elimination of Indian presence from Afghanistan and the control of the pivot in the Afghanistan's power center are the two major objectives of Pakistan in Afghanistan. Before the large military power of India, Pakistan finds no other way, but to promote terrorism and militant activities against India in Afghanistan. The USSR invasion in the late 1970's provided an ideal condition for Pakistan to apply her 'strategic depth' against India in Afghanistan. (Narayanan, 2010) Pakistan's 'strategic assets' (terrorist and militant forces) are to be safely protected in various 'lockers' in Afghanistan. Pakistan has identified terrorism as the key tool to act against multifaceted strengths of India. By using this opportunity, Pakistan has been using the Afghan land to train anti-Indian militant forces. The Pak based terrorist groups like Harkat-ul-Mujahidin (HuM), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and



Lashkar-e-Toiba are provided safe platform in Afghanistan as a base to promote activities in opposition to India, especially Kashmir. (Hanauer & Chalk, 2012, p. 26) Pakistan largely used the tactic to encourage Islamic proxies against India there. For her, these militant and insurgent wings are the strength against the traditional military solidity of India. (Narayanan, 2010) By using these tools Pakistan tries to destabilize India and wants to dominate the region.

Pakistan is quite conscious of India's multifaceted strengths in the areas like demography, geography, economy, military, etc, and she had a zero sum outlook regarding Indo-Pak game in Afghanistan. (Hanauer & Chalk, 2012, p. 25) Any advantage of India in Afghanistan is considered by Pakistan as her loss. Thus Pakistan is fearful of even simple presence of India there. More and more assistance and engagement policies of India are perceived by Pakistan as an encirclement strategy to contain her influence in the region. Hence Pakistan is eager to have a pro-Pak regime in Afghanistan which is potential enough to expel India from there.

Another major objective of Pakistan is to subside the historical conflict over border issues and Pashtunistan problem between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It had been this Afghanistan-Pakistan border rivalry which makes India and Afghanistan in close ties in the first three decades since 1947. Pakistan is prudent that a consonant government in Afghanistan will not compromise the historical rival conflict of Pashtun nationalism. The artificial Durand line, made by British India was not at all recognized by the Afghan governments till date. Even the Pakistan supported Taliban government rejected in accepting Durand line and sticking on to the historical claim of Afghanistan over a part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and actively promoting Pashtun nationalism. (Rashid, 2010)

Apart from these, for advancing energy and trade security, Pakistan

set her goals to touch the Central Asian Republics. (Hanauer & Chalk, 2012, p. 25) Pakistan's energy deficiency demands her to connect CARs. By maintaining an active support from Afghanistan to connect her to the Central Asian region, Pakistan also wanted to reduce the relevance of Chabahar port where India finds an alternative and thereby it is possible to undermine the relevance of Zaranj-Delaram highway. (Mukhopadhaya, 2010, p. 34) India-Iran-Afghanistan co-operation on Chabahar port development and the consequent economic alliance among these tripartite impose a great threat to Pakistan indirectly. Chabahar port in Iran and Gwadar port in Pakistan are distanced by merely 70km and in this context the billions of dollars investment made by India in the Chabahar port poses threat to Pakistan strategically and economically. (Javaid & Aslam, 2016, p. 672) After USA, Afghanistan is the second largest export market for Pakistan. (Javaid & Aslam, 2016, p. 677) Thus Pakistan fears that the arrival of Indian goods in Afghanistan will destabilize Pakistan economy. The possibility of close connectivity created by the trade and economic transactions through the Chabahar port will also be a strategic threat to Pakistan in several dimensions. Hence, she needs to prevent India-Afghanistan connectivity through the Chabahar port.

Pakistan has also been scared about the role of Iran, Russia and USA in Afghanistan. Pakistan is doubtful about various bilateral strategic partnerships like India-Afghanistan, India-US, India-Iran, India-Russia, US-Afghanistan, Iran-Afghanistan, etc. (Javaid & Aslam, 2016, p. 676) Pakistan fears the role of Iran and Russia due to historic reasons. India, Iran and Russia were supporting the anti-Taliban (anti-Pakistan also) group of Northern Alliance in the 1990's. (Hanauer & Chalk, 2012, p. 28) In the changed circumstances, US-Pakistan rapport has also been declining. In Afghanistan both are

suspecting each other. The growing Indo-US relation is also assumed as a threat to her in the region. In the initial phase of US-Taliban peace talks, Pakistan was terrified that it will be diminishing her relevance and strategy in Afghanistan. It is in this context, Pakistan has adopted strategy to ally with China and with the Chinese support, Gwadar port development mission is also on the track. China-Pakistan alliance in Afghanistan may become a forthcoming security threat to India in pursuing her regional interests.

Indian objectives in Afghanistan, to a considerable degree, are determined by the Pakistan's role in Afghanistan. Only a steady and peaceful Afghanistan can provide India a fruitful result. India is scared about the return of radical Islamic ideology and brutality and if so the consequent deluge of terrorism will subvert the whole Central Asia-South Asia region. (Chandran, 2014) Indian interests in Afghanistan are based precisely on two major aspects that are the prevention of re-emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan and to throw away Pakistan's anti-Indian roots from the land. (Kaura, 2017, p. 36)

It becomes clear that India and Pakistan are nourished with conflicting interests in Afghanistan. In the aftermath of 9/11 and fall of the Taliban both are competing to regain the pivot of Afghan power center. India predominantly used her soft power strategy and over the last eighteen years, Indian assistance to Afghanistan has crossed \$3 billion. (Ibrahimi, 2019) While India was actively engaging in the reconstruction and stabilizing process in Afghanistan, Pakistan was behind the creation of an unstable and unfertile Afghanistan to block Indian growth there. (Felbab-Brown, 2015) While doing this, Pakistan does not think about her existence and better future in the region. Her one and major concern is to obliterate the Indian presence in Afghanistan so that she could be the winner and 'manager' of the region.

## **Insurgency, Terrorism and Indo-Pak Rivalry in Afghanistan**

In the backdrop of 9/11 incident, a new phase of Indo-Pak rivalry is opened in Afghanistan. The growing concern of India for Afghanistan provoked Pakistan at various phases. As per one of the reports, Islamabad is fearful of a strong relationship between India and Afghanistan. (m.economictimes.com, 2015) Pakistan has to prevent India's sprouting strategic depth in Afghanistan at any cost. When Taliban lifted into power in 1996, Pakistan thought it as a precious anti-India element in Afghanistan (Chaudhury, 2019). But the war on terror and the subsequent developments in Afghanistan paved a new opportunity of engagement for India in the competing land. Pakistan believes that India has been using her embassy and consulates in Afghanistan for anti-Pakistan activities. With these in mind, Pakistan has been leading to the outbreak of several attacks against India both within and beyond the boarder of Afghanistan for the last 19 years. Pakistan has always tried to have a net-work relation with the radical insurgent group within Afghanistan. But she always forgets the fact that an unstable Afghanistan could never give a stable Pakistan.

India's reconstructive role in Afghanistan provoked Pakistan to held frequent attacks against Indian men and materials. The construction employees from India were often abducted by insurgents which compelled India to send her paramilitary force for giving security to the Indian mission there. (Pant, 2013, p. 110) (Dasgupta, 2013, p. 10) It was on July 7, 2008, Haqqani network conducted a massive attack against Indian embassy in which 58 fatalities and 141 casualties were reported. (Hanauer & Chalk, 2012, p. 29) The intelligence sources of US and Afghanistan recognized the role of ISI (Pakistan spy agency) in this attack. (Felbab-Brown, 2015) One year later, there held in October 2009, another bomb

blast near the Indian embassy in which 17 deaths (mostly Afghans) and 63 casualties were reported. (Dalrymple, 2013) In the same year, again Indian diplomatic headquarters in Kabul was attacked in December. (Abhyankar, 2015, p. 375) Again the role of Haqqani network and ISI were disclosed by US officials.

In February 2010, two major Indian guest houses were exposed to insurgency made by Taliban group in which 18 lives were lost including 9 Indians and 36 others were injured. (Dalrymple, 2013) Another, Haqqani network led onslaught was done against Indian consulate in Jalalabad in August 2013. (Abhyankar, 2015, p. 375) In two different terrorist assault held in Kabul in the year 2014, India again lost four citizens. (www.mea.gov.in, 2016) The same year witnessed another strike against Indian consulate in Herat on the day of the beginning of the first Narendra Modi government which is reported to have conducted by Lashkar-e-Toiba. (Felbab-Brown, 2015) (Abhyankar, 2015, p. 371) Again, four Indians were lost in an attack on May 13, 2015 against Hotel Park Palace in Kabul. (www.mea.gov.in, 2016)

In all the above mentioned attacks Pakistan's trickery was revealed by many intelligence agencies. They have come up with evidences of anti-Indian activities by Pakistan in Afghanistan. Many Indians have lost their lives within and beyond Afghanistan due to the Pakistan's cabal. It is not a recent phenomenon. Since the Taliban regime, Afghanistan has been using as an anti-Indian terrorist training center by Pakistan. Several US based studies also bring out evidences in this direction. Recently, the Special Report to the USIP (United States Institute for Peace) states that "under the Taliban, Afghanistan became a training ground for Islamabad-sponsored militants waging a guerilla war in Indian administered Kashmir" (Constantino, 2020)

Most of the US analysts estimated Indo-Pak conflict as the source

of interminable turmoil in Afghanistan. Indo-Pak rivalry has been elevated to Afghanistan. Since the formation of the two- India and Pakistan in 1947, the bilateral rivalry over Kashmir was a regional security issue. But now (since 2001) it has been raised to a global security concern. (Rubin, 2006, p. 12) In both the Durand line and Line of Control (LoC) [Afghanistan-Pakistan and India-Pakistan borders], the extremist forces are related to each other (Mazzetti & Schmitt, 2008) and in both the cases Pakistan is regarded as their patron. US's annual 'Country Report on Terrorism 2018' accused the double stand played by Pakistan, that is on the one side she argues for the political reconciliation in Afghanistan, but on the other, promote and provide safe shelter to the various factions of militancy including Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network. (Chaudhury, 2019) Along with the mention about the terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba & Jaish-e-Mohammad which are having their base in Pakistan, the report also brings about the failure of Pak government to limit such groups in the country and beyond. Many Pakistani fighters have become the members of the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) which again severe the security threat in Afghanistan. (Ibrahimi, 2019) Hence, along with Kashmir, Afghanistan has also been witnessing Pakistan sponsored anti-Indian terrorist attacks for more than a decade.

### **Doha Agreement and New Phase of Indo-Pak Rivalry**

The most 'celebrated' Doha peace agreement signed between USA and Taliban on 29<sup>th</sup> February 2020 has been a major stumbling block to India for pursuing her strategic interests in Afghanistan. The deal is considered by Pakistan as the justification of her hither to played covert war strategy in Afghanistan. (Chawla, 2020) This in turn, enables her to make more such proxy wars against Kashmir.

Imran Malik, a retired brigadier of Pakistan and a columnist of 'The Nation' wrote that, India is losing her game in Afghanistan and her decade long investment in multiple sectors will become a big 'zero' after the proposed peace deal becomes realized in Afghanistan. (Malik, 2019)

Even during the process of the peace deal, the Taliban has not repudiated the practice of its brutality. ([www.thehindu.com](http://www.thehindu.com), 2019) In the Doha agreement the provision is made to release a massive number of Taliban prisoners who are in the official custody of the government. But, amidst the realization of this deal, Taliban made several attacks at different levels. (Balachandran, 2020) Sher Mohammad Stanekzai, one of the representatives of the Taliban in the peace talks expressed Taliban's aspiration to conduct more such attacks against government forces and other such mechanisms and he argues that there are no such remarks about the truce with the Afghan government in the deal. (Bakhshi, 2020)

It provides clear indications to India about her future security threat. There are no provisions related to the prohibition of anti-Indian terrorism in Afghanistan and beyond. The deal is a strategic play of USA for having a safe escape from Afghanistan where Pakistan is seated near to the goal post. In this new context, India should expect a re-entry to the '1996 Afghanistan'. In such occasion 'new Afghanistan' will resemble the Kashmir to a further level.

Since the US-Taliban direct peace talks began, India has become more conscious on the Kashmir region. Both Kashmir and Afghanistan became more prone to the Pakistan sponsored attacks. Analysts are of the opinion that, Indian decision to tighten her control of Kashmir by the abolition of special privilege to the Kashmir is due to the concern about the predicted changes in Afghanistan in the context of progressive peace talks. (Bhattacharjee, 2019) Pakistan has also

tightened its side of the rope and more terrorist factions and camps in Kashmir and Afghanistan give implications in this direction.

Evidences of recommencement of training of terrorist groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) in Nangarhar province by Pakistan's ISI was traced out by Afghanistan force's raid in April 2020. (Gupta, 2020 (a)) The Afghan force reveals that among the terrorists who are killed, include 5 Afghan Taliban and 10 JeM members which reveals the link between the two. The UN black listed, Kashmir targeted terrorist outfits JeM has prepared its 400 insurgents at its training camps in Afghanistan and this move of JeM was reported as set up, even after the February 29 historic pact between the Taliban and USA (Gupta, 2020 (b)) According to a counter terror official based in Kabul, "Jaish cadres have been deployed with Taliban units in areas between Khost to Jalalabad in east Afghanistan and also in areas close to the Pakistan border in Kandahar province." (Quoted in (Gupta, 2020 (b)))

The new developments provide clear warning to India about more such expected growth of anti-Indian extremist forces in Afghanistan. There are two major threats in this context for India. Firstly, India wants to protect billions of investments made by her in Afghanistan during the last two decades and secondly, she needs to check the infiltration of more aggressive factions of terrorist groups into Afghanistan and Kashmir valley. In short, the upshot of recent developments in Afghanistan in the light of the Doha deal is implying that the balance of power in Afghanistan is in favour of Pakistan. The reflection of it could be seen in Pakistan's play in both Kashmir and Afghanistan.

### **Afghanistan-The New Kashmir**

In the last two decades Afghanistan has been used as an ideal

ground to play her proxy war against India by Pakistan. Unstable Kashmir is a 'key resource' for Pakistan; similarly the distraught Afghanistan is contemplated by Pakistan as an ace in the hole. (Hanauer & Chalk, 2012, p. 1) Pakistan believes that she is more closer in terms of cultural and religious proximity with that of both Kashmir and Afghanistan and found them as effective ground to employ religious extremism against India. When the religious extremist Taliban personnel were seated in the power centers, Afghanistan has become an optimal terrain to breed anti-Indian forces with the intelligence support of Pakistan. (Abhyankar, 2015, p.373) As in Kashmir, the terrorist infiltration in Afghanistan also compelled India to deploy more security forces for the protection of her men and material. (Kaura, 2017, p. 33)

The increasing Sino-Pak nexus, the foundation of which was laid in the aftermath of 1962 India-China war (Khokhar, 2020) is a growing threat to India, that too is crystal clear in their joint venture in Kashmir and Afghanistan. China and Pakistan together made several attempts against India to bring the Kashmir issue to the UN forums. (Chawla, 2020) China imposes potential security threat to India in this geo-political setting. Pakistan has been elevated into the Chinese camp and is having a major role in many of Chinese led projects in this region. China's reluctance to oppose Pakistan sponsored anti-Indian terrorism along with the growing rapport between the two in the Gwadar port enhancement project foist severe economic and geo-strategic threats to India in the region. (Khan, 2013, p. 80) For Indian connectivity to Central Asian region also both Kashmir and Afghanistan pave an easy connect way. But the acute Pakistan is capable enough to inflict double check at Kashmir and in the Afghan territory which in effect could undermine India economically and strategically.

Pakistan has also shown her astute in linking Kashmir and Afghanistan each other. After the Indian reprisal act to the February 2019 Pulwama attack, Pakistan locked her air space which connect Kabul-Delhi commercial flights. (Ibrahimi, 2019) One of the opposition leader of Pakistan named Shahbaz Sharif, in his Parliamentary speech criticized that Indian policies on Kashmir under Narendra Modi will make negative impacts up on peace process in Afghanistan; and in another occasion, a Pakistan emissary to USA pressurized that the aggravate Kashmir dispute will smash the US led peace process in Afghanistan. (Ibrahimi, 2019) Also the Pakistan Premier, in his visit to USA in September 2019, tried to connect kashmir issue to the Afghan peace and brought it into the discussion agenda. (Ibrahimi, 2019) All these imply that both Kashmir and Afghanistan are anti-Indian battle ground for Pakistan. Also, they indicate future threat to the Indian presence in Afghanistan. It is through all these efforts Pakistan attempts to legitimize her anti-Indian terrorism in Afghanistan.

In order to suppress Indian interests in Afghanistan, Pakistan finds that the promotion of terrorist forces as an ideal method which she experienced and proved in Kashmir all these decades. Like Kashmir, in Afghanistan also Pakistan aims to annihilate Indian presence. The zero-sum perspective of Indo-Pak conflict led her to formulate policies for total control of both Kashmir and Afghanistan without leaving even a single piece to the Indian domain. Before the strength of India (military, economic and political), Pakistan feels it difficult to fight a direct war. Three major Indo-Pak wars taught the lessons of her incapability before Indian strength. In order to burry this bitter past and to realize her long cherished goal, Pakistan has relied more upon the terrorist proxies against India.

In terms of conflicting interests of India and Pakistan, intensity



of security threat (both physical and psychological) against India and also Pakistan's use of proxy war and religious capsules against India, Afghanistan has acquired every possible chance to be called as 'the new Kashmir' in the region.

## **Conclusion**

India and Pakistan, born with rivalry over Kashmir are still carrying on with the animosity with its radius extended up to the Hindukush ranges in Afghanistan. The growing Indo-Pak dispute over Afghanistan has been exemplifying it as a 'new Kashmir' in the western border of Pakistan. The first four decades since independence, Pakistan had been denied an easy entry to Afghanistan essentially due to the bilateral skirmishes between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Soviet invasion and subsequent developments enabled her to recognize the major thrust areas of co-operation (religious extremism) between the two. During the religious extremist regime under the Taliban, Pakistan has been relishing her moment of glory in Afghanistan. It is at this context the fall of the Taliban government created distress for Pakistan and thereby started recreating 'Kashmir' in Afghanistan.

Both Kashmir and Afghanistan are considered as an existential threat by Pakistan and also Pakistan's military has set her physical survival against India as the preeminent goal, for the attainment of which she has devoted her full energy to the promotion of terrorism. For the last four decades, Pakistan has never revoked her policy of 'bleed India' and for the attainment of it the method of proxy war was intensively used. In the beginning Kashmir was the bone of contention that too as major territorial issue. But with the last two decades, this contention has been elevated to Afghanistan as a geo-strategic rivalry. Pakistan's religious and cultural proximity with

these two facilitate her to employ stringent anti-Indian extremism and proxy war methods which eventually transform Afghanistan into a 'new Kashmir' in the region.

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## HOUSEHOLD SECTOR SAVINGS IN INDIA: WHAT DOES THE GROWTH RATE TELL US?

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### **Abstract**

*It was theoretically argued that financial liberalization in India since 1991 will augment household savings, especially household financial savings. What determines economic growth is the productive investment that connected to household financial savings rather than physical savings. However, in the Indian context, data do not lend credence to the argument that financial liberalization augmented household savings, especially financial savings. The present paper tries to statistically establish the growth trends in household savings and its subcategories, financial and physical savings using the recent econometric methodology of estimating multiple structural breaks and growth rates in time series data. Such a study is pivotal since the attempts to study the behaviour of household sector saving in India show is not conclusive due to the differences in methodology adopted in different studies. In this paper, we try to overcome this limitation through multiple structural change models to estimate trends in household savings and its subcategories using the long-term time series data from 1950/51 to 2017/18. The trend analysis which we have undertaken in this study statistically establishes the weak performance of the household savings in the post financial liberalisation period.*

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**Key Words:** Household Savings, Financial Savings, Physical Savings, Financial Liberalisation, Structural Analysis

In a developing economy like India, financialization of household savings is important since it determines the extent to which liabilities

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of public and private corporate sectors can be held by households (Pandit, 1991). In the pre-reform period, the Indian financial system was characterized by administered financial regime known as '*financial repression*'<sup>1</sup> with an objective to mobilize savings and channelize them into desired investment. However, it was argued that regulated interest rate regime suppresses savings rate and reduces availability of loanable funds for investment leading to inefficient allocation of resources and low growth (D'Souza, 1998; Hansen, 2004, Bandiera, 2000). During 1970s and 1980s, there emerged a consensus that "Government failure" is a feature of regulation and consequently a neo-liberal view has emerged on the working of financial markets. Goldsmith (1969) and later McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) consistently challenged financial repression policies. They argued that the market clearing interest rates and reduced government intervention through financial liberalisation could raise allocative efficiency via higher savings and investment. Financial liberalization helps in increasing the mobilization of savings by creating appropriate incentives. The broad objective of financial liberalization in India was to ensure that the market driven financial sector will contribute significantly to economic growth by efficient financial intermediation of savings and by channelizing these resources to deficit and productive units. Theoretically, the benefits of financial liberalization and increased participation in formal financial markets that enhances household savings are extensively discussed and documented in the literature (Campbell, 2006). The theoretical underpinnings of financial liberalization unanimously agree that in terms of asset allocation, the increased participation in financial markets and financial savings extend improved liquidity and diversification than what offered by physical savings (Badarinza et. al., 2016). The models that predict savings as a key determinant of economic growth also connect savings with productive investments

which are in turn mapped to financial savings rather than physical savings<sup>2</sup> (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980).<sup>3</sup> The financial savings ensure greater participation in financial markets through increased use of financial instruments and definitely provide significant benefit to savers not assured by the physical savings (Badarinza et. al., 2016). Such a participation in financial markets and the resultant increase in financial savings is guaranteed by the advocates of the financial reforms. Notwithstanding theoretical argument of high financial savings under financial liberalization, a perusal at the Indian household savings scenario reveals that the average allocation to physical assets seems to be an optimal portfolio allocation even in the context of financial policy reforms bringing competition, diversification and efficiency in financial markets (Badarinza et. al. 2016). To provide a clear context, in 2011/12 National Sample Survey Organisation estimated that nearly 70 percent of aggregate annual household savings flow into physical assets (NSSO, 2012; Kumar, 2011). This issue has been a serious concern among the policy makers for both theoretical and practical reasons. On the theoretical side, dissecting the empirical association between savings and growth in to causal mechanisms is of utmost importance in achieving higher economic growth and poverty alleviation. The low performance of household savings, particularly financial savings, questions the virtuous cycles in which high household savings promotes faster growth. On the practical side, it is often argued that high saving is associated with good macroeconomic performance and sustainable access to financial markets. However, though higher levels of financial savings can contribute to domestic stability, in the Indian context, the household savings performance, and especially, the performance of financial savings do not lend credence to the argument that financial liberalization act as insurance against the risk associated with fragile financial system and imperfections (Yamini and Deokar, 2012). The



poor performance of gross household savings, especially financial savings pose a challenge to long run economic growth and the policy makers in India.

Against the above background, the present study describes and attempts to explain patterns in household savings in India with special focus on financial liberalisation period. Taking a methodological deviation from other studies analysing trends and patterns, we estimate for structural breaks in the time series data on household savings for the period 1950/51 to 2017/18. Our deliberate intention is to analyse the trends in household savings especially its sub divisions into physical and financial savings to establish the general perception that household sector savings have recently started declining, especially the financial savings – the pivotal component expected to perform a strategic role in economic growth under financial reforms. Such a study is of utmost importance since the results regarding the performance of household sector saving in India show mixed results. The trend analysis which we undertake in this study, hope will help us to substantiate the weak performance of the household savings. The study is divided into four sections. Following the introductory section, in section 2, we compare the household savings performance in the pre and the post liberalisation periods to set a stage for our estimation of structural breaks and growth rates in section 3 using structural change. In section 3, we estimate the structural breaks and growth rates following the methodology of structural analysis adopted by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003). Section 4 concludes the paper.

### **Household Sector Savings: Pre and Post Reform Trends**

In this section, we analyze the trends in household savings and its subcomponents-financial and physical savings in the pre and post financial liberalization periods. We use the share the data on the share of savings in various sectors of Gross Domestic savings calculated

from Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy. The data is in 2011-12 prices. Over the years, there occurred subtle changes in the sectoral contribution of various sectors to Gross Domestic Savings (GDS). GDS constitutes three sectors viz., Household Sector, Private Corporate Sector and Public Sector. In this section, we use decadal averages to study the trends. As anticipated, the share of public sector in GDS has witnessed a secular decline from 24.71 per cent during 1970s to 3.84 per cent during the period 2010/11 to 2017/18. Against this, the private corporate sector savings met with tremendous increase from 8.76 per cent during 1980s to 38.68 per cent during the period 2010/11 to 2017/18 on a sustained basis. While the decline in public sector savings can be attributed to the declining role of public sector since 1990s, the enormous increase in the private corporate sector savings reflects the pivotal role the private sector has attained in economic growth after reforms. However, what is important is the growth of Household Savings in the post reform period because this is the sector that has long been recognized as a prime determinant of economic growth in the economic literature (De Melo and Tybout, 1996; Athukorala and Sen 2001). It is showed that the essential link through which savings influences economic growth is by transforming the determined household savings in to productive investments (Abiad et. al. 2004). In this context, it is noteworthy that the share of Gross Household Savings in India has declined from 76.96 per cent during 1990s to 69.18 per cent during 2010/11 to 2017/18 (Table 1). More importantly, this decline had happened after showing some signs in the immediate period of reforms. The trend line plotted in figure 1 clearly suggests that though household savings stagnated over the period, it witnessed clear decline in the recent years of reforms. The question pertinent here is that what contributed the household savings to decline in the post reform period after showing the signs of growth in the initial years?




**Table 1: Sector-wise Share of Gross Domestic Saving  
-Decadal Averages (in percent)**

Decades	Household Sector	Private Corporate Sector	Public Sector	Total
1970/71 to 1979/80	66.53	8.76	24.71	100
1980/81 to 1989/90	70.58	9.09	20.33	100
1990/91 to 1999/00	76.96	15.82	7.22	100
2000/01 to 2009/10	76.83	19.87	3.30	100
2010/11 to 2017/18*	62.79	38.68	-1.47	100

\*Includes only eight years

Source: *Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy*, Reserve Bank of India, Various Years

**Figure 1: Trends in the share of Household Savings in Gross Domestic Savings (in per cent)**



Source: *Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy*, Reserve Bank of India, Various Years

The reason for the reduction in the share of household savings in GDS will be clearer only when we look at the composition of the two subcategories of household savings viz., financial savings and physical savings. During 1980s, the share of physical savings and

financial savings were 50.10 per cent and 49.90 per cent respectively. But after the introduction of financial liberalization in 1991 the trend got reversed temporarily with the corresponding figures 45.11 per cent and 54.89 percent during 1990s (Table 2). This reversal in favour of financial savings immediately after liberalization could not be sustained as predicted by the financial liberalization hypothesis of increased access to financial markets and diversification of financial portfolios stimulating financial savings. This is evident from the fact that the physical savings have regained its importance during 2000s to reach a higher average level of 53.13 per cent. More interestingly if we take the recent period of financial liberalization, i.e., 2010/11 to 2017/18, the growth rate is higher with 54.80 per cent. On the other hand, the financial savings have declined to 46.87 per cent during 2000s and further to 45.20 per cent towards the period 2010/11 to 2017/18. It is noteworthy that except 1990s, the decadal average values of financial savings in the next two decades 2000s and 2010s are lower than that of 1980s (Table 2). It shows that in the post financial reform period, there is a clear trend of allocating more to physical assets (non-financial assets). The trend of allocating more to physical assets in the Indian context is puzzling both for the theoretical and practical reasons in the context of wide-ranging financial reforms. For any further analysis on the factors leading to low performance of financial savings, we need to have a statistically proved evidence on the low performance of financial savings in India. Thus, it is necessary to establish statistically the weak performance of household savings especially financial savings in India. In the next section, we intend to establish the trends we noticed in this section by using a well-defined methodology structural trend analysis introduced by Bai and Perron (1998).

**Table 2: Sector-wise share of Household Savings -Decadal Averages (in per cent)**

Decades	Financial Savings	Physical Savings	Total
1970/71 to 1979/80	37.60	62.40	100
1980/81 to 1989/90	49.90	50.10	100
1990/91 to 1999/00	54.89	45.11	100
2000/01 to 2009/10	46.87	53.13	100
2010/11 to 2017/18*	45.20	54.80	100

\*Include only 8 years

Source: Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, Reserve Bank of India, Various Years

### Growth of Household Sector Savings: Multiple Structural Change Model

Using a recently developed econometric estimation procedure of structural analysis, in this section, we test for multiple structural breaks and corresponding growth rates in Savings with reference to household savings. This methodology allows us to analyse the turning point(s) of savings during the period of analysis, i.e., 1950/51 to 2017/18. The analysis using this methodology helps us to identify different periods of savings growth endogenously determined rather than based on any exogenous information. In other words, instead of dividing the data arbitrarily according to some information like the date of initiation of a policy change, change in political regime etc. the data identify the periods of change in the growth momentum using structural breaks. The methodology that we use is one developed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) which estimates and tests for multiple structural breaks in a time series and subsequently applied by Perron and Zhu (2005) to historical data for ten OECD countries.

### Methodology

We estimate growth rates of Household savings. Further, growth rates are calculated for the sub categories of household savings viz., financial and physical savings. Thus, the growth rates for three categories viz., Household savings, Financial savings and Physical savings were estimated using the exponential function  $\ln S_t = a + bt + u_t$ , where  $\ln S$ ,  $b$ ,  $t$  and  $u$  denote the log of Savings, growth rate, time trend and error term respectively.  $a$  and  $b$  are the parameters of the model and vary from one period to another. To estimate the growth rates using this function, we first identify the break dates of the above model for the categories of Savings considered for estimation. After identifying the structural break dates, the time series data for the period 1950/51 to 2017/18 is divided into different periods. Once the periods as per structural breaks were identified, corresponding growth rates are calculated for each saving category.

Having specified the exponential function for estimating growth rates, we now explain the methodology for estimating the break dates. Because, it is the break dates that help us to periodization and period-wise estimation of growth rates. We specify the exponential growth model containing  $n+1$  growth regimes and  $n$  break dates ( $T_1, \dots, T_m$ ) as follows.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \ln S_t &= a_1 + b_1 t + u_t, & t &= 1, \dots, T_1 \\
 \ln S_t &= a_2 + b_2 t + u_t, & t &= T_1 + 1, \dots, T_2 \\
 &\vdots & & \\
 \ln S_t &= a_m + b_m t + u_t, & t &= T_{m-1} + 1, \dots, T_m
 \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

Following the convention, we use  $T_0 = 0$  and  $T_{m+1} = T$ , the number of observations. The number of break points  $m$  and the break dates ( $T_1, \dots, T_m$ ) are assumed as unknown and estimated endogenously from the data.<sup>4</sup> The superiority of the methodology proposed in our

paper is that it can estimate simultaneously multiple structural breaks in a time series as developed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) based on the Least Squares principle common to regression analysis. The break dates are estimated as global minimisers of the sum of squared residuals from an OLS regression equation (1) using a dynamic programming algorithm (Bai and Perron, 2003). We present the procedure below.

As mentioned earlier suppose that the number of breaks is  $n$ . Then for each partition  $(T_1, \dots, T_m)$  denoted as  $\{T_p\}$ , we obtain the associated least squares estimates  $\beta_p = (a, b)_p$  by minimizing the sum of squared residuals  $\sum_{j=1}^{m+1} \sum_{t=T_{j-1}+1}^{T_j} [\ln S_t - a_j - b_j t]^2$ . By using the  $\beta_p$  estimates thus obtained, we compute the sum of squared residuals – denoted  $S_T(T_1, \dots, T_m)$  – associated with the partition  $\{T_p\}$  in the time series. Now, the estimated break points  $(T_1, \dots, T_m) = \text{argmin}_{(T_1, \dots, T_m)} S_T(T_1, \dots, T_m)$ , where the minimization is over all possible partitions  $(T_1, \dots, T_m)$  such that  $T_i - T_{i-1} \geq h$ . Note that  $h$  is the minimum length assigned to a segment and  $T_i$  is the  $i^{\text{th}}$  break point. The procedure considers all possible combination of segments and selects the partition that minimizes the sum of squared residuals. Thus, the least-squares estimates of break dates are those that minimize the full sample sum of squared residuals in equation (1). This procedure is used to sequentially estimate the optimal break points for the series starting from one to the maximum allowed by  $T$  and  $h$  (Bai and Perron, 2003).

To identify the break dates using the present methodology, we fix the minimum length of a segment,  $h$ , as eight years. The minimum length of a segment, eight, means that a maximum of eight breaks can be obtained for a time series data on savings over the period 1950/51 to 2017/18. The possible number of eight breaks mean that, corresponding nine policy regimes (periods of change in growth momentum) can be identified (Bai and Perron, 2003). Based

on  $h = 8$ , the search for possible breaks would be confined to the period 1957-58 to 2013-14. After identifying the breaks, the growth rates across regimes are estimated by imposing kinks at the estimated breakpoints according to the procedure due to Boyce (1986). This procedure helps us to maintain the continuity of the exponential trend line at the estimated break points.

## Data

The period covered in our study includes 1950/51 to 2017/18. We select this period to understand the household savings behaviour in different development regimes in the post-independence period of economic growth in India. Primarily we intend to study whether there is any significant structural break in household savings behaviour with regard to financial liberalization period since 1991. This will help us to study the dynamics of household savings behaviour in the pre and post financial reform periods. We use data on Household Savings and its sub categories, Financial savings and Physical Savings obtained from Hand Book of Statistics on Indian Economy published by Reserve Bank of India. Savings as a ratio of GDP at market Prices is used for the analysis. The data used in the study are in 2011-12 prices.

## Results and Discussion

The estimated structural break dates<sup>5</sup> and the growth rates for the associated sub-periods for Gross Household Savings and its sub categories viz., financial savings and physical savings are provided in table 3. We first report the growth rates of household savings for the period under study. It was seen that household savings witnessed three break points viz., 1964/65, 1986/87 and 2009/10. Consequently, the growth rates for periods are reported in the table. Corresponding to the first break in 1964/65, the growth rate of household sector savings was 3.42 per cent for the period 1950/51 to 1964/65. Next break occurred in 1986/87. With this, household savings growth

doubled compared to previous period and stood at 6.26 per cent during the period 1965/66 to 1986/87. But, the growth rate of household savings with the third break in 2009/10, though showed positive and significant growth during 1987/88 to 2009/10, it is very low compared to previous period. It is important to note that though most of the years during the period 1987/88 to 2009/10 coincide with financial liberalization, the growth rate of household savings has not grown tremendously compared to pre financial liberalization period. Moreover, the growth rate of household savings declined sharply to 3.24 percent during the later period of reforms that is 2010/11 to 2017/18 with the 4<sup>th</sup> break occurring in 2009-10. The conclusion can only be that the substantial liberalization of the economy in the years following 1991 has not succeeded in raising the growth rate of household savings. This result tempts us to ask the question why financial liberalization has not resulted in better growth in household savings compared to pre-reform period. To shed light into this aspect, we now analyse the growth of the subcategories of household sector savings, viz., financial and physical savings.

We examine the growth rate of financial and physical savings based on the theoretical argument mentioned earlier that financial liberalization will augment household savings through the increase in financial savings. In this context, we argue that the growth of financial savings in India was not significant enough to increase the growth of household sector savings. Rather, it was the increase in physical savings that helped household savings to prevent a sharp decline at least in the early period of reforms. This is evident from the analysis that follows. In the case of financial savings, there are five breaks identified in the data. Correspondingly, there are six growth rates obtained for six different periods. In 1960/61, the first break occurred. As a result, during the period 1950/51 to 1960/61, financial savings registered a growth rate of 8.69 per cent, which

**Table 3: Structural Breaks, Periods and Growth Rates: Household Savings, Financial savings and Physical Savings**

Saving	First Break	Second Break	Third Break	Fourth Break	Fifth Break	--
Gross Household Savings	1964-65 (+)	1986-87 (+)	2009-10 (-)	--	--	--
	Period 1	Period 2	Period 3	Period 4	--	--
	3.42* [1950/51-1964/65]	6.26* [1965/66-1986/87]	6.84* [1987/88-2009/10]	3.24* [2010/11—2017/2018]	--	--
Financial Savings	1960-61 (-)	1974-75 (-)	1991-92 (-)	1999-00 (-)	2009-10 (+)	--
	Period 1	Period 2	Period 3	Period 4	Period 5	Period 6
	8.69* [1950/51-1960/61]	7.45* [1961/62-1974/75]	6.37* [1975/76-1991/92]	-0.97* [1992/93-1999-00]	-1.30* [2000/01-2009/10]	2.13* [2010/11-2017/18]
Physical Savings	1964-65 (+)	1986-87 (+)	1996-97 (+)	2009-10 (-)	--	--
	Period 1	Period 2	Period 3	Period 4	Period 5	--
	2.81* [1950/51-1964/65]	5.65* [1965/66-1986/87]	6.72* [1987/88-1996/97]	7.30* [1997/98—2009/10]	5.34* [2010/11-2017/18]	--

Source: Calculated by authors using data from Hand Book of Statistics on Indian Economy, RBI.

Notes: (i) - and + shows decline and increase in savings growth rate after the break.

(ii) Estimates with \* shows that the growth rates are significant at 1 per cent level.

(iii) Periods of the reported growth rates are provided in brackets.

is significant at 1 per cent level. With further breaks in 1974/75 (2<sup>nd</sup> break) and 1991/92 (3<sup>rd</sup> break) growth rates are obtained for two periods, i.e., 1961/62 to 1974/75 and 1975/76 to 1991/92. During these two periods, growth rates have declined to 7.45 per cent and 6.37 per cent respectively showing statistical significance at 1 per cent level. However, it is significant to note that, as per the 4<sup>th</sup> break in 1999/2000 and 5<sup>th</sup> break in 2009/10, the growth rates have declined substantially and became negative with rates -0.97 per cent and -1.30 per cent respectively during the periods 1992/93 to 1999/2000 and 2000/01 to 2009/10. Not surprisingly, these periods coincide with the twenty years of financial liberalisation. This reflects the fact that against the expectation, financial liberalisation met with drastic reduction in the mobilisation of financial savings. Though the growth rate of financial savings became positive and significant (2.13 per cent) towards recent period 2010-11 to 2017-18, it is much lower than the growth rates in the pre reform periods. In nutshell, though there is an improvement in recent years, liberalisation has failed to bring substantial growth in financial savings.

Contrary to financial savings, the growth rates for physical savings obtained for all the associated sub periods identified through structural breaks reveal positive growth. In the case of physical savings, four structural breaks were identified and growth rates for five periods were obtained within the period 1950/51 to 2017/18. Physical savings in all the five periods witnessed positive growth rate. The physical savings growth which was 2.81 per cent during 1950/51 to 1964/65 with the first break in 1964/65, increased to 5.65 per cent during the period 1965-66 to 1986-87 with 2<sup>nd</sup> break in 1986/87. Further, the growth rates of physical savings increased to 6.72 per cent and 7.30 per cent respectively during the periods 1987/88 to 1996/97 and 1997/98 to 2009/10 (with 3<sup>rd</sup> break in 1996/97 and 4<sup>th</sup> break in 2009/10). However, after the 4<sup>th</sup> break

in 2009/10, the growth in physical savings though positive and significant, declined to 5.34 per cent during the sub period 2010/11 to 2017/18. But, in spite of this decline for the recent period, it is to be noted that compared to financial savings, the growth of physical savings is remarkable in the post financial liberalization period. Though one may argue that financial savings growth has improved from -1.30 per cent in 2000/01 to 2009/10 to 2.13 per cent during 2010/11 to 2017/18, this growth in financial savings was not sufficient to compensate for the decline in physical savings during the period 2010/11 to 2017/18 so as to augment the household savings growth in India. The trend analysis reveals that financial liberalization has not produced desirable impact on financial savings in India as envisaged in the theory of financial liberalization. In this context, one may argue that it is the physical savings that helped the household savings to at least maintain generally a stagnating trend the post reform period.

## **Conclusion**

On the basis of the theoretical importance of household savings in economic growth and the general perception of declining household investment in India, the study tried to estimate the growth of household savings in India. It was seen that the household savings in India has not showcased the desirable growth in the post-reform period as anticipated by the advocates of financial liberalisation. The estimation of growth rates of household saving subcategories-physical and financial savings, gives us a striking feature that Indian households have increasingly favoured physical over financial savings. As we mentioned earlier, the behaviour of household savings and more over the preference towards physical saving within household savings is theoretically puzzling. Though there are studies both in favour and against the success of financial reform policies in promoting savings, one stream of thought vehemently argues that even after



financial liberalization, the prevalence of incomplete information, credit rationing, segmentation of financial markets etc. resulted in unanticipated and undesirable consequences on the mobilization of savings particularly household savings (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1994; Shah, 1999). In line with this, our analysis also primarily suggests that the Indian experience of financial liberalization in a neo-liberal framework aimed at removing imperfections in the financial markets did not bring the expected outcome. More clearly, the uncertainty and imperfections that existed in the financial markets might have affected the asset household portfolio by influencing the wealth allocating decisions of holding various assets in favour of physical assets. In nutshell, financial liberalization intended to create favourable environment and access to financial markets could not influence the asset portfolio of households to accelerate the accumulation of financial savings. Creating the policy environment that incentivizes new financial savings instruments to alleviate the dependence on physical savings needs to be analytically studied in the Indian context. This paper highlights the need for a comprehensive study to understand how financial liberalization respond to savings mobilization to produce unanticipated and undesirable changes in the financial market that led to a decline in household savings mainly through the shift away from financial to physical savings. How reforms failed to accumulate domestic savings has not been so far subjected to a systematic enquiry. A better understanding of household savings at a more micro-level to shed light on the nature and pattern of the allocation of household savings in various categories in the post reform period is pivotal in two dimensions. First, as an essential input, how savings impact growth depends upon the allocations of household savings. Secondly, documentation and analysis of the process in which how household savings and asset portfolio allocation adjusts in relation to household expectations in a neo-liberal policy context assumes great significance.

## (Endnotes)

### 1 End Notes

- 1 *Financial Repression is a period characterized by government controls and interventions in financial markets through indiscriminate nominal interest rate ceilings, high reserve requirements obligatory holdings of government bonds, interest rate ceilings etc. not only to preserve financial stability and protect the public from unexpected losses, but also to limit concentrations of wealth and monopoly power (See Vovides (1993), Demetriades and Luintel (1997) etc. among others for discussion on financial repression).*
- 2 *Household savings being a subcategory in Gross Domestic savings can further be decomposed in to financial savings (financial assets) and physical savings (physical assets). While financial savings constitute monetary assets like currency, deposits, bonds, shares and debentures etc. physical assets constitute physical assets like real estate assets, durables, equipment etc.*
- 3 *Starting from simple Harrod-Domar formulations (Harrod, 1939; Domar, 1946) to modern formulation of growth theories by Lucas (1988), Romar (1986) etc. the savings-growth nexus has been widely discussed.*
- 4 *The conventional approach to establish a structural break was to conduct the 'Chow Test'. This test identifies structural breaks by testing the statistically significant difference in its parameters across two periods. In other words, Chow test identify a point of inflexion in the data and estimate for different period based on that. However, taking a deviation from the conventional path, the present methodology in the paper estimate simultaneously multiple structural breaks in the time series data of savings. For more details on this aspect see also Balakrishnan and Parameswaran (2007).*
- 5 *Breakdates in our trend analysis are estimated using the software package 'strucchange in R' written by Zeileis, Leisch, Hansen, Hornik, Kleiber and Peters (2005).*

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## **WOMEN SECURITY IN AGENDERED SPACE: A BRIEF SURVEY ON TEA PLANTATIONS OF KERALA**

**Abdul Nazer K\***

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### ***Abstract***

*Credit goes to the colonial powers for popularising tea plantation in India. The colonial powers selected North Eastern and Southern India as the suitable place for tea cultivation. During the colonial period itself the management recruited families for employment and many estates women outnumbered men in the work force and the workers were oppressed severely. After independence, many legislations are introduced to improve the workers in general and women in particular. But majority of such provisions are in paper or in document. Both formal and informal agencies failed not only to ensure the general workers security, but the security of women as well. The informal agencies such as the trade union are patriarchal in character and failed to address the specific issues facing women. The globalised era, the women organisation such as Pembilai Orumai openly protested not only against the improper functioning of the plantations but also the male dominant trade union leadership.*

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**Keywords:** *Plantation, Division of Labour, Women Security, Labour Legislation, Negotiation, Labour Governance.*

Since the beginning of organised life itself, women in the country are making financial contributions for the betterment of their families. Since independence Their participation in economic activities of the country has grown immensely since independence. Increase participation of women in such type of activities not only helped them to narrow down the gap between their needs and resources, but also has given rise to a number of complex issues having

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a direct bearing on their socio-economic conditions(India,2019). Agriculture has been considered as the oldest form of farming practiced by the people in the civilized world. At present, many of the advanced countries of the world has been shifting their priorities from agriculture to industries as their main source of economic activity. At the same time, majority of the developing countries, agriculture is still influential in determining their livelihood. India is one such country where more than sixty per cent of people still depends upon agriculture for their livelihood (UN,2011).

Plantation sector comes under the framework of both agriculture and industry which offers employment for more than two million workers in the country and plays a vital role in the export of agricultural production(India G. O., 2019). Approximately fifteen per cent of the total export earnings comes from plantation crops. Tea is one such a plantation crop highly popular in all parts of the country. It is largely cultivated in North Eastern Parts and Southern part of India. In southern parts, it is mainly concentrated in Tamilnadu, Kerala and Karnataka. South India occupies 22.32 per cent of tea area (113199 hectares) and account for 24.16 per cent of output (204552 tonnes). In southern part of the country, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Karnataka are the major tea growing regions contributing 65.66, 32.48 and 1.86 per cent respectively. Specifically speaking, Karnataka occupies 0.42 per cent (2106 hectares) and Tamil Nadu occupies 14.66 per cent (74331 hectares) tea area of India (Tea Board,2019).In Kerala, tea plantation is mainly focused in Idukki and Wyanad districts. Approximately there are 154 tea plantation estates operating in Kerala, offering employment to 98000 permanent workers. In addition to this, approximately 125000 temporary workers are labouring in different tea plantations of the state. In terms of gender, the strength of male workers represents 45.96 per cent (34365) and female workers represents 52.95 per cent (39592) of the workforce(India, 2019).

Generally speaking, majority of the workers in tea plantations, are clustered as either unskilled or semi-skilled workers category. Low level literacy and lack of general awareness make them more vulnerable to exploitation. The workers are less aware of the legal and welfare provisions governs and regulates them. Inequality of wage and income is extremely high between the workers and the management staff. The monthly income of an average tea worker from plantation labour was below Rs. 10000, at the same time, the general manager of an average plantation company receives a monthly salary around Rs. 2 lakhs and a senior manager gets a monthly income of Rs. 1.5 lakhs, in addition to accommodation facilities and service of personal servants. Some of the management staff, after their retirement, bought and ran small estates with their salary savings (Jayachandran, 2016). But the workers, who spend their entire life in plantations, retire with a smaller amount of savings, which is not at all sufficient to purchase even a piece of land to build a residence for their entire family.

### **Women Workers in Plantations a Historical Overview**

Historically, women have been in a disadvantaged position for centuries. In the colonial period women workers were denied equality of status and wages. The plantation owners tend to devalue women's labour in tea plantation by creating a division of labour. The majority of women workers engaged in collecting tea leaves had spent dawn to dusk in the plantation field and the majority of male workers are involved in factory work. Women workers are rarely found in factory work because of certain social and physical prejudices and often stated that women are comparatively less suited for heavy work (Bhadra, 2004).

Plantation work remains one of the most labour intensive and lowest paid occupational categories which consistently includes a number of women. There has been a steady increase of women



workers since many decades. The women workers are high in tea plantations due to the general belief that agriculture based, low mechanization tea plantation industry, suits the physical strength of women (Bhadra 2004). It is desperate to say that majority of women workers are coming from the marginalised and deprived sections of the society and these workers makes important contributions to the agricultural and rural economies of the developing countries. But their roles considerably vary between and within regions and are fluctuating rapidly in many parts of the world.

Since its establishment, women workers have been an integral part of the labour force of plantation industry of the state. The planters believed that women are more committed than men in gathering of tea leaves. So, they preferred women for doing this job. It is commonly believed that the soft hands and nimble fingers of women are best suited for tea leave plucking. Due to this reason, the presence of women workers is more in many plantations of the country (India G.O,2019). In every plantation, the employer is bound to provide proper housing and other welfare facilities such as, free quarter, free fuel and fire-wood, free health services, free grazing land, cultivatable lands, maternity benefits, bonus, etc., which have, perhaps, made the conditions of employment more attractive apart from standardized working hours and a weekly holiday.

The workers of the tea plantation can be divided into management staff and the workers. The management staff consists of Manager, assistant manager, field supervisor or conductor and are based on strict hierarchy. The management staffs are recruited by the management based on their educational qualification and technical know how. The operational side of the tea plantations are normally divided into two broad categories: (1) operations performed in the field and (2) manufacturing process carried in the factory. The most important operations performed in the field are the collection of tea leaf. The

factory work and supervisory work are monthly salaried category reserved only to men with a few exceptions. Women themselves do not aspire to these works and the management consider themselves unfit and incapable with the requirement of handling machines and commanding labourers (Mani, 1984).

The workers category consists of field workers and factory workers and these category of workers are unskilled and majority of them are being uneducated. Apart from the field workers and factory workers, a few others working in hospitals and crush. About 70 per cent of the plantation workers grouped as field workers category and almost all of them are unskilled. Among the field workers 63 per cent of them are women workers (Nazer, 2019). These women workers are doing the job of plucking of tea leaves. They have to perform this task from dawn to dusk from 7am to 5pm with one hour lunch break. Their wages and target of work is fixed from time to time in Plantation Labour Committee(PLC) meeting.

The field workers, engaged in plucking of tea leaves usually spend 8 to 9 hours in the field and they are not allowed to go anywhere. Attendance is compulsory in the morning and evening. If any worker absents in the morning or evening, they get only half wages. On many occasions their work site is far away from their residence and after completing their work, reach home very late. The place of collecting tea leaves are called *Kadu'* where they have to spend majority of their time without toilet facilities. This shows the pitiable condition facing the field workers, whom majority are woman. In times of flush, work for one or two extra hours is common. The workers task and corresponding wages are fixed in the state from time to time. At present they have to pluck 28 kg of tea leaves for receiving their daily income of Rs 301. If they collect more than the target, they earned additional amount. A worker normally collects more than hundred kg of tea leaves during the peak season. If they



collect tea leaves between 28 kg to 50 kg, they earn an additional amount of .50 paise per kg. If it is beyond 50 kg the slab rate is different and they earn Rs.1 per kg for this work. This is another kind of capitalist exploitation commonly found in tea plantations and on many occasions, women are the victim. For instance, a worker gathers more than 28 kg of tea leaves beyond their daily income they should get only 14 rupees. The movement of the workers beyond the plantations, is also restricted due to the fact that the workers should collect more if they stayed in the field.

As stated in earlier paragraphs, since the colonial period itself, the management recruited families for the job in tea plantations with specific intensions. The family settlement ensured the reproduction of labour and thereby the continuous supply of cheap labour, generation after generation. This has increased the dependency factor and created vulnerability of workers. Due to the intense competition among different planters for labour, the *Kankanis*<sup>2</sup> were vigilant in the monitoring of the movement of workers. The mobility of labour beyond the estates was restricted and acts of 'indiscipline' and sometimes were dealt with physical punishment by the kankanis. In order to ensure sufficient labour supply, the agents gave an attractive picture of plantations to new recruits and detained the workers beyond the period of contract (John, 1999).

The colonial legacy of desperate, working and living conditions, continued in tea plantations of the state for many decades after independence. Many of the plantations provided the same housing facilities to the workers that the colonial authorities had left. But in the meantime, some legislations introduced by the government after independence resulted little bit improvement to the living and working conditions of the workers. Thereafter a facility having a veranda, a room, kitchen and a latrine was allowed to a household. Latrine facilities for the inhabitants in a particular *layam*<sup>3</sup> were constructed in a single line, few meters away from the 'layam'. Some

of the tea plantation companies provided a common bathroom for all households to the side of the 'layam'. Male and female members of the household, often, depend on rivers, streams and public ponds in and around estates for bathing. Women members, sometimes bathe in the evenings or nights in the backyard of the lines. Later some companies like TATA and AVT HML built attached bathroom cum latrine to each residential unit (Jayachandran, 2016).

### Women's Security in Tea Plantations of Kerala

*The findings of various committees such as Krishnamoorthy Committee, appointed by Government of Kerala (GOK 1978) and the Central Study Team, or the legislative delegation 2001 observed that there is a wider gap between different acts and their implementation in plantation sector. The PLA 1951 lays down many measures for the welfare of women workers. But in actual reality many of the provisions were in paper or document only. For instance, PLA ensured the workers pure drinking water, but many of the plantation did not provide these facilities and the result was that the women were compelled to fetch water after completing their job in the evening. On many occasions the working field is far away from their residence and which makes their life quite difficult. There has been a sharp decline in maintenance of living accommodations to workers.*

Security of job is a great concern for all the workers employing in different fields of life. Security of life is connected with their dignified life. There are certain common criteria required for security of life, which includes equal and decent wages, favourable working atmosphere, insurance, accident benefit, provident fund, gratuity etc. Life in the plantation is different and the plantation worker leads a different life. So, the security mechanism prevalent in other industries is different in plantations. Here security mechanism should penetrate not only in the working field, but other fields as well. There are different laws to safeguards and protect the workers

in common and women in particular. At the worksite, women experience many issues, such as the lack of proper latrines facilities, job loss during pregnancy period. Women often are sexually harassed by their superiors. But they do not report this due to the fear of losing their jobs. In their home also, the women workers are lacking separate latrine facilities.

Plantation job is considered as an organised job. There are different laws and legislations in plantations to protect the workers particularly women. But as a result of the unsatisfactory implementation of such laws and legislations concerning women workers, there is a wide gap between these provisions and their availability. This result the women workers are deprived of the benefits and amenities like equal remuneration, maternity benefits, proper child care services, etc. Many factors responsible for their difficulty are, indifferent attitude of the employers towards women workers, their weak bargaining power and the ignorance about the privileges and their rights (Jayachandran, 2016).

Almost all tea plantation *paddy*<sup>4</sup> lines, that I have visited shows desperate condition. For instance, the HML management provides single bathroom for each of the household. But provision for separate latrines and urinals for female workers exist as per the Rule 53 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, Section 19 of the Factories Act, 1948, Rule 42 of the Inter State Migrant Workmen (RECS) Central Rules, 1980, the Section 20 of the Mines Act, 1952 and Section 9 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (Labour, 2008). But separate bathroom facilities for women workers is not found in any of the paddy lines. The acts such as Minimum Wage Act of 1948 and Equal Remuneration Act of 1976 tries to ensure some sort of gender equality with regard to their wages. Though PLA of 1951 is a general provision with regard to workers' security in plantations, but many of them are

exclusively for women. The PLA of 1951 is a unique act in the sense that it authorises the employer to provide medical, housing, sickness, maternity benefits and other forms of social security measures to the workers. Apart from this, it also provides the provision for setting up of canteens, crèches, recreational facilities, suitable accommodation and educational facilities to the workers and their families with in the plantations (India G.O,2009).

Historically speaking the post independent era witnessed continuous demands and agitations from the workers, resulted the enactment of labour welfare legislations, which resulted better wage, working and living conditions to the plantation workers (Jayachandran, 2016). As a result of this labour movement, independent Indian Government introduced certain security measures with the help of some reformative legislations. The constitutional provisions such as Right to Equality and the provisions such as Directive Principles of State Policy aimed to ensure the dignity of workers including women. Apart from this, there are other types of laws, both industrial and agricultural, in India which aimed to provides security to all employees both male and female workers. A few of such laws are mentioned below.

The factory Act of 1948 is one of the significant developments in labour legislation of the country. This act came to appear immediately after independence intended to ensure workers welfare in the factories. This act also considers the women workers security. Health and safety of the workers promoted in accordance with this act. This act regulates the working time of women workers and are exempted from night shift in a factory between morning six to seven in the evening. This act also made a provision for crèche for children of women workers if the women employees are 30 or more in the factory.

Maternity Act was passed in 1961 and amended several times aimed to give dignity to women workers. This Act proposed many

provisions for ensuring security of women during their pregnancy period. Before this Act, the pregnant women were facing so many yardsticks. The pregnant women worker had to present in the field and complete their stipulated targets. During this period, what happened in the plantations was that the workers mutually helped themselves without the written permission of the management. The latest amendment to this act has expanded the term of the leave and added certain new provisions. The duration of maternity leave has been raised from twelve weeks to twenty-six weeks. Pre-natal leave has been raised from six weeks to two months (Sarkar & Bhowmik, 1998).

Prevention of Sexual Harassment Act, 2013, of Women at Work Place prohibits harassment of women in any type in work place. While searching different judgements, it can be found that sexual harassment is not rare in factories, industries and plantations. The Vishaka judgement laid down certain guidelines which are obligatory for every enterprise, both agricultural and industrial sector. These guidelines made it mandatory for every employer to provide mechanism to redress the grievance pertaining of sexual harassment at work place and approve the right to equality of working women. Equal payment act of 1976, authorises the employers to pay equal remuneration for equal work, without gender discrimination.

Despite these legislations, the government at the central, state and local self- institutions can play a great role in matters of labour welfare in any enterprise or industry. The workers security is only possible when the plantations are functioning effectively. Here the support of the government is essential. Apart from direct involvement, the government had set up certain institutions for safeguarding the plantations. With such an intention in mind, the Government of India, constituted Tea Board of India in April 1954 under section 4 of the Tea Act, 1953 (Nazer & Pavithran, 2017). The board consists of a chairman and 30 members appointed by the central government constitute the representatives of the government,

management and the workers. It is the duty of the board to take measures for the promotion of tea industry in India. It performs the functions such as providing financial and technical assistance for cultivation, manufacturing and marketing of tea. It performs the duties of registering and licensing tea manufacturing, brokers, tea waste dealers and persons engaged in tea business of blending tea etc (Board, 2019). It extends financial assistance to the plantation workers and their wards through labour welfare schemes.

Another state level department existing for the promotion of workers welfare is the Labour Welfare Department. The functions of this department can be classified into three broad areas viz., industrial relations, enforcement and quasi-judicial functions. In normal case the disputes between the workers and the management can be settled through the process of negotiation and conciliation. If this process failed, the matter is referred to adjudication by labour Courts or Industrial Tribunals. This department is authorised to keep the record of labourers, monitor the labour welfare policies followed by the management in plantations including the inspection of the residential area of workers. Another mechanism in which the workers grievances are discussed and addressed is the PLC. The composition of the committee consists Chairman, trade union representatives and the representatives of management and they have equal in strength. The Government convened PLC meetings at regular intervals and these meetings opened vistas for wide range of discussions between the management, and the trade union leaders (Nazer, 2018). The core issues of workers such as bonus, wage fixation etc, discussed here.

The urge to unite for a common (UPASI, 2019) cause in the plantation sector resulted the emergence of United Planters Association of South India (UPASI) on 28<sup>th</sup> August 1893. Thirteen District Planting Associations assembled on 28<sup>th</sup> August 1893 in the Mayo Hall, Bangalore for a united organization and this resulted

the establishment of United Planters' Association of Southern India (UPASI)(UPASI, 2019). The organisation primarily focussed on to promote tea industry and indulge in tea research activities by organizing different plantation into a common platform. UPASI Tea Research Institute is located at Valparai, in Coimbatore District of Tamil Nadu and it's the administrative cum registered office located in Coonoor, the Nilgiris (Nazer, 2019).

### **Women Welfare Mechanisms in the Present Era**

In the globalised era labour governance system subjected to a strategic shift not only in agricultural sectors but other sectors as well. The governance system prevailed, during the welfare period has changed completely. The management controlled and the state governed institutional structure declined substantially (Gupta, 1994). There are different organisations formal and informal organisations functioning for the workers' rights in plantations. The governmental institutions of the country, the central, state and local governmental institutions of the country are working for workers' rights. The government introduced many measures for the welfare of workers in plantations particularly women. But their implementation is not effective and had not reached fully to the workers. Various legislations of the government presented many measures for women workers welfare. These include separate bathroom for men and women in their residential area, equal pay for equal work, maternity benefit, the service of women doctors in the plantation hospitals etc. While analysing all these things, it is clear that the government machinery failed miserably. Though women workers outnumber men, but many of the plantation hospitals do not have service of women doctors. On many occasions the workers depend government hospitals. In the neo-liberal period, many of the male workers opted better job outside the plantations and they are getting better wages, but the women workers are compelled to stay

in the plantations due to get shelter facilities.

The major problem affected the women workers in the health sector are the non-availability of female doctors in the dispensary. Women workers, whom majority are illiterate, feel shy of consulting male doctors especially in gynaecological problems. In view of the large number of women workers in the plantation industry, a statutory provision for appointment of lady doctor seems to be essential (Bureau,2019).Facilities for pre-natal and post-natal treatment are also inadequate and are to be improved. Frequent and regular medical check-ups also go a long way in improving the health of the plantation workers in general and the women workers in particular(India G. o., 2009).

The informal agencies such as trade union had played respectable role labour matters of plantation sector. Although trade Union Act came into being in 1926, the performance of trade unions was very feeble before independence. Since then some organisations functioned in tea plantations but their role was restricted. Independence brought many changes in the functioning of trade union. Since then trade unions has to play multi-level roles and functions. They bring the attention of government about the different issues and needs of the workers, act as a link between the management and in connection with the workers they directly intervene in their welfare. During this period trade unions only addressed general issues of the workers. In their attempt, they partially succeeded, but the patriarchal trade union leadership failed miserably to address the specific issues the women workers are facing.

On many occasions the trade unions have raised their voices to protect the common issues like wages and bonus. But the women workers have been facing certain specific issues such as the lack of toilet facilities at work site, the non-availability of female doctors in the company hospitals, exploitation in the work site. But the male



centric trade union leadership are not about the specific issues facing women. The role of trade union further changed in the neo-liberal period (Saini, 2003). The sudden withdrawal of government from welfare programmes had adversely affected the plantation sector. The failure of trade unions addressing the specific and general interest of the workers resulted the creation of Pembilai Orumai in Idukki challenged the patriarchal trade union leadership. Their strike was not only against the management but against the hypocritical attitude of the trade unions.

While analysing the gender compositions of trade union leadership in tea plantations, it is found that majority of women are mere trade union members, and forty per cent of the executive committee members. However, in terms of decision making, policy formulation and participation in discussions, it is almost hundred per cent male centric. Most of the unions offers unimportant positions to women (Nazer, 2019). The post of Joint Secretary, Joint Vice-President, are reserved for women. A few leaders in Munnar also admits the fault of non-representation in women in trade union leadership also responded and recognized the weakness of trade union in accommodating the major issues women workers.

## Conclusion

Finally, it can be said that the labour governance mechanism prevailed in tea plantations improved the general condition of workers to a certain extend. The question of women security was not a serious concern for the colonial powers. The independence brought much legislation for plantation workers. The acts such as Factory Act, Minimum Wages Act, PLA made larger provision for workers welfare. The Maternity Act of 1961 specifically addressed the women workers. In the globalised era the workers in general are facing so many yardsticks. This period the government at various

level lost their earlier dominance over industrial management. The globalisation not only reduced governmental intervention quite a lot, but also shortened welfare measures to a larger extend. The patriarchal trade unions set up failed to provide adequate space for women workers. This resulted major issues of the women workers are unaddressed and unattended. The agitations of women workers in Munnar challenging the trade union leaderships projected not only for women issues but also for the general issues that the workers are facing. The existing patriarchal trade union leadership shows a dismal performance. The women issues are unattended and answered. The various stakeholders both the formal and informal organisation failed to address these issues in total.

## Notes

1. In tea plantations estates *Kadu* means the work cite for field workers.
2. *Kankanis* were the middlemen authorised y the management to recruit the workers. In response to this they get commissions and the workers they brought were under the control of them. This system was prevalent during colonial period and continued its existence after independence also.
3. *Layam* is a chained hut commonly found in plantations. It is a large building partitioned into 6 to 7 compartments. Each compartment has one bedroom with single bathroom and kitchen.
4. Both *paddy* and *layam* are used interchangeably mean the same.

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## THE DEPRESSING LIFE OF WOMEN IN SLUM : A STUDY IN THE SLUM OF TRIVANDRUM

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### Abstract

City is one of the important reflections of urbanization. It is an explanation of urban growth and development, but on the other hand there are many social situations that pose challenge towards the phenomena. One among that is the unstoppable growth of **slums** with a deprived background. It creates and molds a population with less advantage and more deprivation. Especially the situations of women in slums are more deplorable and needs to be changed. Moreover they face social stigmas and exclusion because of their identity as "slum dwellers". Through this paper the analysis of two objectives, such as, to study the socio- economic background of the women in slum as well as the problem they face for being a slum dweller are going to be discussing. For the purpose of the study one of the main slums in Trivandrum, namely Karimadom colony was selected. The sample of the study was 64 and the tool used for data collection was a semi- structured interview schedule. The main findings of the study shows that the necessity of empowerment of women in slum through educational as well as employment opportunities and thereby the total emancipation of the community will make more development of the women in the slum.

**Key words:** Slum, Women, Identity, Stigma, Exclusion

Urbanization refers to the population of a nation living in urban areas and is an indicator of modernization, the sign of growth and economic progress. Urban growth is an inevitable fact of the futures in India. The growth in urban population is somewhat threatening the availability of basic services, such as water, housing, transportation,

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and electricity etc. This result in urban shanty towns becomes weighed down by poverty, pollution, congestion, homelessness and unemployment. The existence of 'slum' is one of the major problems faced in almost all the major cities or towns throughout the world.

The word "slum" was first used in London at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century to describe a "room of low repute" or "low, unfrequented parts of the town", but has since undergone much iteration in meaning and application (UN-HABITAT, 2003b) A Slum is a densely populated usually urban area marked by crowding dirty rundown housing, poverty and social disorganization. A Slum is a residential area with substandard housing that is poorly serviced and or overcrowded, and therefore unhealthy, unsafe, and socially undesirable. A slum is usually considered as a highly populated urban residential area consisting mostly of closely packed, weak housing units in a situation of deteriorated or incomplete infrastructure. Slums are the product of socio- economic and cultural conditions of a particular social system restrain the physical, mental, moral and social development of the dwellers. The conditions in the slums affect the capacity of the individual to develop, and participate directly in the activities of the wider community life of the city.

In India the total number of identified slums according to 2011 census is 6.56 Crore. In a study on "Causes of Urban Poverty in India: How to Improve Life in the Slum" done by Habitat for Humanity Organization (2017) stated that, one in five people across the world live in slums and substandard housing, locking them into a grinding cycle of poverty. Nearly one in four urban residents' lives in a slum. Urban poverty in India is unique, particularly in the way that it follows certain patterns of growth. Though the proportion of urban poor has reportedly declined over the past decades, the numbers keep growing up, because of the persistent nature of slums. In 2001 according to the National Report (India Habitat III by the

Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation) about 23.5 per cent of urban households were slum dwellers. This percentage had decreased to 17 per cent by 2011 even though the total number of households living in slums had gone up from 10.5 Million in 2001 to 13.75 Million in 2011.

In slums across the world, there is a noticeable lack of basic infrastructure, services, and basic shelter. Slum life has never been easy for the urban poor insofar as housing and living conditions are concerned. For **women**, the problems are especially acute. The social situations of their life in slum always negligible and is hosting challenge towards their life in many ways<sup>1</sup>.

When go through the literature, many studies shows that women in slum are socially, physically and economically backward. But through the analysis, the researcher found a research gap that, there was meager consideration upon the exclusion they faced only because of their identity as a slum dweller. To them being identified as a slum dweller in society seems to be an anti- social experience for majority of the respondents. It shows that the study is more relevant and particular for find out the reason, its impact as well as the need of change in developing the situation of women in slum.

## **Objectives**

1. To study the socio- economic background of the women in slum
2. To find out the problems faced by women in slum through their social identity as a slum dweller

## **Hypotheses**

1. There is association between the age and the extent of social stigma faced by women in slum
2. Higher the educational attainment lower will be their problems by the identity as a slum dweller

## Method

For the purpose of the study the researcher selected respondents who were aged from 18 years from the universe Karimadom colony. According to the report of local self government, the slum inhabited with 2000 of families approximately. However after collected the demographic and Ward wise details from Trivandrum Corporation the researcher selected 64 samples through purposive sample method. Both primary and secondary data were collected for verify the objectives under study. The study was carried out by a semi-structured interview schedule to gather the entire aspect of their situation. Primary data were collected from respondents using semi-structured Interview schedule. Secondary data were collected from books, journals, published research works and authorized websites. The design used in this study was descriptive and exploratory in nature. The selected data analyzed through quantitatively and qualitatively.

## Conceptual definition

**Social identity:** According to Henri Tajfel “Social identity is a person’s sense of who they are based on their group membership(s).”

**Hesitation:** According to Cambridge Dictionary, Hesitation refers to “the act of pausing before doing something, especially because you are nervous or not certain”

**Stigma:** According to Cambridge Dictionary, Stigma refers to “a strong feeling of disapproval that most people in a society have about something, especially when this is unfair.”

According to Merriam Webster Dictionary, stigma refers to a “mark of shame or discredit”

**Exclusion:** Duffy in 1995 defined exclusion as, “Exclusion is a broader concept than poverty, encompassing not only, low material means but the inability to participate effectively in economic,

social, political and cultural life and in some characterizations, alienation and distance from mainstream society.”

**Deprivation:** According to Cambridge Dictionary, “Deprivation is a situation that people do not have things or conditions that are usually considered necessary for a pleasant life.”

## Results and discussion

### 1. The Socio- Economic Background of the Women in Slum

Every slum is portraying the life situation of people who resides there. Through the study it was found that socially and economically, women in the slum possess a poor background. The Table 1.1 shows the overall socio- economic profile of the respondents under study.

Out of the 64 respondents, majority (54.68%) of them were belongs to the age group of 38 – 47. Religious wise data shows that most (46.87%) of the respondents belong to Muslim community. In the slum many kind of caste found but people in the slum were not reported any kind of casteism among them. They cherish all kind of festivals and occasions together without alarming any communal feelings. When analyzing their educational background, it was found that out of 64 respondents, 40.62 per cent of them were having education up to high school level. There were also reported that due to marriage and other household chores they couldn’t continue the education. Thus most of them were had to drop out their education even they were good and interested in education. The study also shows that those who were not educated (7.81%) were not youngsters but elderly who couldn’t receive proper education at their childhood.

It was also found that (57.8%) majority of the respondents were doing some sorts of employment like domestic work, flower braiding, running petty shops, tailoring etc in terms of coolie work and self employment. But on the other hand there were still 42.18 per cent of the respondents who were unemployed. It also closes to

**Table 1.1**  
**Socio – Economic Profile of the Respondents**

Socio – Economic Profile of the Respondent	Variables	No: of Respondents						Total	
	Age	18 - 27	28– 37		38 – 47		48 and above		64 (100%)
		8 (12.5%)	14 (21.87%)		35 (54.68%)		7 (10.93%)		
	Religion	Muslim		Hindu		Christian			
		30 (46.87 %)		26 (40.62%)		8 (12.5%)			
	Caste	OBC	SC		OEC		General		
		35 (54.68%)	14 (21.87%)		11 (17.18%)		4 (6.25%)		
	Educational attainment	Not educated	Primary level	High school level	Secondary level		Degree level		
		5 (7.81%)	13 (20.31%)	26 (40.62%)	17 (26.56%)		3 (4.68%)		
	Occupation	Coolie		Self employed			Unemployed		
		14 (21.87%)		23 (35.93%)			27 (42.18%)		
	Marital Status	Married	Single			Widow		Deserted	
		49 (76.56%)	12 (18.75%)			1 (1.56%)		2 (3.12%)	
	Monthly Income of the Household (in rupees)	1000- 2000	2000-3000		3000-4000		4000- 5000	5000and Above	
3 (4.68%)		6 (9.37%)		26 (40.62%)		11 (17.18%)	18 (28.12%)		
Ownership of the House	Own	Govt. undertaking			Rent	Lease			
	7 (10.93%)	35 (54.68%)			8 (12.5%)	14 (21.87%)			

the rate of employment in the study. When analyzing the marital status of the respondents, majority (76.56%) of the respondents were married.

It was very important to analyze the monthly income of the households to understand the economic background of the respondents and thereby their families. By the analysis it was evident that they face economic hardship. Most (40.62%) of the respondents were having income in between 3000 – 4000 rupees monthly. Among the respondents neither they nor the family members have a stable income source. Little or meager employment of the respondents or their family members, and pensions were the main sources of income to the respondents. Thus for meeting their daily as well as family needs such as educational purpose of the children, medical purposes and miscellaneous aspects, most of the respondents had to borrow money from private lenders with high interest due to lack of proper security to lenders. Respondents who were in self help group took loans from Kudumbashree groups and also from small micro finance; which lends money with the security of identity proofs. Though the slum located in government land majority (54.68%) of the respondents living in flats constructed by government. Thus the homes to them were owned by government. But the study also found that some respondents were living in their own homes that were constructed by themselves but in a substandard condition as temporary shelters with materials such as bricks, coconut leaves, metal sheets, asbestos and plywood. Even though they constructed it as temporary shelters most of them were living under the roof about 10- 20 years of old.

## 2. Problems Faced by Women in Slum through Their Social Identity as a Slum Dweller

In general the problems of a slum are its anti- social activities and poor socio- economic background. But when analyze deep into the

situation it was very clear that more that of an explicating nature there were lots of implicit elements that were affected and created for them.

The study shows that women in slum facing more problems in terms of their gender and identity as a slum dweller. The major problems they face other than the general notions are bound with two aspects, such as *exclusion* and *deprivation*. Because by the identity as a slum dweller whatever their socio- economic standards, they experience exclusion and deprivation in terms of their dwelling in slum. From the study it was found that during the time of spouse selection, in time of searching jobs for livelihood, in educational institutions and in other public places when they disclose their place of living, majority of them had to face some sorts of exclusion and deprivation as bullying and emotional torture. The study reveals that, they hesitate to reveal their place of living to others because of the stigma they have to face. Stigma on their place of living reflects to them as in terms of bad impression, lack of consideration, avoidance etc.

As the word hesitation explains, the women in slum feels uncertainty or doubt to disclose the place of living while interacting or interrelating to others. It is very clear that to a great extent woman in slum experiencing exclusion and thereby of deprivation so that they hesitate to disclose their place of living to others or avoiding the chance of getting acknowledged as a slum dweller for the better identity.

For better understanding of the situation, the researcher analyzed the data with many variables. And by analyzing the age of the respondent it was clear that, in every stages of life of women in slum they were facing the stigma. Table 2.1 intended for analyze the extent of hesitation they face on the basis of their age.

**Table 2.1**  
**Age and the Extent of Hesitation to Disclose the Place of Living to others**

Extent of Hesitation Age	To a great extent	To some extent	Not at all	Total
18 - 27	6 (75%)	1 (12.5%)	1 (12.5%)	8 (12.5%)
28 - 37	9 (64.28%)	4 (28.57%)	1 (7.14%)	14 (21.87%)
38 - 47	18 (51.42%)	12 (34.28%)	5 (14.28%)	35 (54.68%)
48 and above	4 (57.14%)	2 (28.57%)	1 (14.28%)	7 (10.93%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>37 (82.81%)</b>	<b>19 (12.5%)</b>	<b>8 (4.68%)</b>	<b>64 (100%)</b>

The study shows that out of the 64 respondents, majority (82.81%) of them hesitating to disclose the place of living to others to a great extent. Among them the respondents who belong to the age group of 18-27 were more reported the issue.

During the study one of the respondent said that “*I am anxious about the marriage of my child...because we couldn't get a better alliance if we live here... we are planning to leave to some other place when she matured*”, she said desperately. Only 4.68 per cent of the respondents said they were not at all feels any hesitation upon their place of residence.

From the analysis (Table 2.2) it was evident that the educational attainment also not at all changing the situation of women from escaping the problems such as exclusion and deprivation rather majority of them said that “*even if we have much education, other will sense us as colony people, uncultured and uncivilized.*” The study shows that majority (75 %) of the women in slum face problems just because of the dwelling in slum. Among them 100 per cent



**Table 2.2**  
**Educational Attainment and extent of problems faced by women in slum**

Educational attainment	Extent of problems			
	To a great extent	To some extent	Not at all	Total
Not educated	3 (60%)	1 (20%)	1 (20%)	5 (7.81%)
Primary Level	9 (69.23%)	4 (30.76%)	-	13 (20.31%)
High school Level	18 (69.23%)	6 (23.07%)	2 (7.69%)	26 (40.62%)
Secondary Level	15 (88.23%)	1 (5.88%)	1 (5.88%)	17 (26.56%)
Degree Level	3 (100%)	-	-	3 (4.68%)
Total	48 (75%)	12 (18.75%)	4 (6.25%)	64 (100%)

of the respondents who have degree level education said they were experiencing bullying due to their place of residence. Only 6.25 per cent of them responded that they were not at all experiencing any problems.

### Summary and Conclusion

Individuals are social beings rather than a mere human being. Thus as a social being every individual are socializing and interacting and interrelating with each other but some section of society or people are marginalizing in terms of their identity. Somehow this situation becomes the prolonged stain of every slum and its people which holdback the generations from achieving a better education, occupation, and standard of life.

Majority of the people in slum were facing exclusion when disclosing their identity as a slum dweller. Most commonly in times

of spouse selection, employment seeking, getting house etc they face some sorts of exclusion and stigma. Impression of others as “colony” is ill treating the identity of people in slum as a whole. The study shows that those who are having higher education were also not intend to be disclosing their identity as a slum dweller. The people feel low self esteem in the matter of their dwelling in the slum. The study clearly shows that fear of bad impression from others were common among them.

People in slum need emancipation from the clutches of exclusion and deprivation by improving mainly their educational rate and occupation by themselves and socio-physical developmental amenities by the help of the government. It will excludes the slumness from the generation and thereby a better standard of living and environment.

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