

## Revitalising India in the Indian Ocean: Indian Navy's Joint Maritime Exercises as a Strategy in the Indian Ocean towards the Global South

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**Abstract:** After a long spell of hibernation, a change in India's perception towards the maritime world began in the 1990s. The existing literature on India's maritime policy primarily addressed India's necessity to reclaim its lost glory in the oceanic world in the changed global political scenario. This study departs from the existing literature on tracing the role of India's multilateral maritime exercises and implications for its 'global south strategy'. The present study primarily focuses on India's maritime military exercises as a strategy for materializing India's Global South strategy in the Indian Ocean region. Thus, two primary research questions are identified in this study: (i) Why did India extensively expand its maritime exercises with other states in the contemporary period (ii) How did India place the Global South in her multilateral maritime exercises? The present study used qualitative analysis of both primary and secondary data to explore these questions.

**Keywords:** Indian Ocean, India's Maritime policy, Indian Navy, Military Exercises, Global South.

The Resurgence of India as a Maritime power raises challenges and opportunities for the state. Though the maritime tradition of India dates back to the ancient era of trade linked with ancient Graeco-Roman and Mesopotamian civilisations, Independent India still needs to reclaim its lost prosperity in the oceanic world. Partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947 changed the course of action of independent India. Consequently, border tensions began to develop between India and its neighbours. India is immersed in territorial disputes at its north, west and eastern borders. This inward-looking trend in post-independent India's foreign policy posture is being referred to as Continentalism by scholars like C Rajamohan. Consequent to this practice, India had abandoned a vast 'Oceanic world', laying at India's backyard. Post-independence, India depleted much of its vigour in dealing with Pakistan and China, and little attention was paid to its maritime neighbourhood in the Indian Ocean.

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Hence, India postponed the 'Oceanic' preference and demand for a profound maritime policy supported by an equipped and enhanced Navy. Defence spending figures show the poor preference given to the Indian Navy until the 1990s.

K M Panikar was the pioneer among the Indian strategists who foresaw the relevance of the Indian Ocean. Panikkar observed about the Indian Ocean that "while to the other countries, the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is vital sea...the Indian Ocean must therefore remain truly Indian," i.e. India's Ocean (Panikar, 1945, p. 12). Panikar argued that an Oceanic policy was needed for India so that "a ring can be created around India..within the area so ringed, a navy can be created strong enough to defend its home waters, then the waters vital to India's security and prosperity can be protected" (Panikar, 1945, p. 15).

Naval strategist KeshavVaidya also shared the same strategic thoughts about India's future role in the Indian Ocean in his work *The Naval Defence of India* (1949). Vaidya also emphasised that "even if we do not rule the waves of all the five oceans of the world, we must at least rule the waves of the Indian Ocean" (Vaidya, 1949, p. 91). K M Panikaer and K Vaidya emphasised the need to create a strong Indian Naval force and its overseas deployments and stressed the need to establish strategic relationships with states like Ceylone (Sri Lanka), Mauritius, Singapore and Maldives.

The Indian Ocean is the only oceanic world named after a single country, India, which shows the state's prominence, reach, and influence. India's maritime geography consists of 7,516 km. The long coastline faces the Arabian Sea to the west, the Bay of Bengal to the east, and the vast Indian Ocean to the south (Kumar, 2013, p. 68). "Indian Ocean, [is a] body of salt water covering approximately one-fifth of the world's total ocean area." The Indian Ocean is bounded by Iran, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh to the north; the Malay Peninsula, the Sunda Islands of Indonesia, and Australia to the East; Antarctica to the south; and Africa and the Arabian Peninsula to the west. In the southwest, it joins the Atlantic Ocean south of the southern tip of Africa, and to the east and southeast, its waters mingle with those of the Pacific Ocean" (Britannica, 2024). Geographically lying in India's backyard, India should have prominence in the region for politico-economic and security reasons.

After a long spell of hibernation, a change in India's perception towards the maritime world began in the 1990s. Specific levels of (though) superficial changes in India's worldview and perception of international structures have contributed to what is known as "a reprioritisation of India's foreign policy priority as a maritime power" in the contemporary world. Most of the existing literature on India and the Indian Ocean- Paniker (1945), Vaidya (1949), Menon (1998), and Ministry of Defence (Navy) (2015) are either focusing on India's engagement in the Indian Ocean since the

ancient time or an attempt to project India's necessity to reclaim its lost glory in the Indian ocean. The existing literature also accounts for changes in India's strategic and economic interactions with the world. Indian Navy's (2015) document also stresses the need for increased cooperation and coordination across and among friendly nations. In this context, the present study aims to identify the goal of India's multilateral maritime exercises. However, this study departs from the existing literature on tracing the role of India's multilateral maritime exercises and implications for its 'global south strategy'. This study identifies two primary research questions to address this line of thought: (i) Why did India extensively expand its multilateral maritime exercises in the contemporary period (ii) How did India place 'the Global South' in her multilateral maritime exercises? The present study used qualitative primary and secondary data analysis to explore these questions. Data published by the government of India and other concerned governments would form part of its primary sources, and secondary sources cover books, articles and internet sources.

### **Concepts used**

The present study has used several terms, explaining that the same may render accessible communication of their use in this space.

Grand strategy is "more than a military concept it's a coordinated execution of statecraft in support of national interest and involving numerous agencies besides the Armed forces" (Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2007, p. 15).

Joint Military strategy is one such instrument of grand strategy along with economic and diplomatic strategy; it is a nation's attitude towards war and use of military force to materialise its national interest.

A state's maritime strategy expresses its overall approach to the oceanic world; it has many facets, including economic, commercial, military, and technological.

Maritime military strategy: The military dimension of India's maritime military strategy is known as India's Maritime Military strategy, which is an integral part of India's Joint Military strategy and consequently forms part of India's Grand Strategy design. Indian Navy primarily executes India's maritime military strategy by coordinating with other forces. It has three significant facets; "force employment in peace, force employment in crisis/conflict and strategy for force build-up" (Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2007, p. 3).

### **India's Multilateral Maritime Exercises**

The existing literature comprehends that maritime exercises are either part of force build-up or an expression of naval strength. The present study departs from this point, and an attempt has been made to explore the scope:

- (I) India's multilateral maritime exercises as a strategy itself
- (II) India's multilateral maritime exercises align with its foreign policy aspirations. Hence, it works as a tool to materialise its overall foreign policy aspirations.

The government of India (GoI) claims that “the aim and objective of joint maritime exercise include providing operational exercises, enhance interoperability and undertake mutual exchange of best practices, special operation tactics, and to develop cooperation among the armed forces of participating nations” (Ministry of Defence, 2021). The history of India's joint maritime exercises shows that the state started its maritime military exercises in 1992 with the MILAN. In 1993, India and Singapore) conducted a joint naval exercises off the Bay of Bengal ( (Das, 2013, p. 123). The present study identified that in the 21st Century, India's maritime exercises were on a surge, especially with:

- (i) littoral states in the Indian Ocean
- (ii) extended neighbourhood in the Indian Ocean
- (iii) Major powers in the world

#### **India's Foreign Policy and Indian Navy**

In the recent past, when GoI devised its *Look East Policy* in 1992, the Indian Navy extended possible support by engaging the region by conducting a joint maritime exercise in the same year. In a democratic country, its forces are expected to work in tandem with the national policies framed by the civilian leadership. In India, the Indian Navy is consistent with the country's foreign policy priorities and facilitates the platform to implement them, given its capabilities. In the post-Cold War context, India reprioritised its foreign policy aspirations in tune with the changing international scenario and diversified its trade partners. Contemporary India revisited its maritime strategies according to the changed worldview.

The present study recognises a similarity in the regions identified by the Indian Navy and the Ministry of External Affairs through various statements and documents. India's Ministry of External Affairs declared in the Rajya Sabha (the upper house of the Indian Parliament) that the focus of India's foreign policy remains its immediate and extended neighbourhood. Its ties with countries in the region are guided by the Neighbourhood First Policy, Act East Policy, Think West Policy and Connect Central Asia Policy (Government of India, 2023). Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) stated that "guided by SAGAR India is making a concrete contribution in connectivity, capacity building enhancing maritime safety and security ...etc. in the Indian Ocean domain" (Government of India, 2023). Thus, it is clear that contemporary India has identified its priority regions like South Asia, the Gulf Region, West Asia, and East Asia along the Indian Ocean region. Further, India also identified Indo-Pacific as a priority

region that extends from Africa to America.

The Indian Maritime Security Strategy (2015) also identified primary and secondary areas of geographical importance, which are represented in the tabular data.

Table 1 Core Areas of Interest of Indian Navy and Ministry of External Affairs

Primary Areas of Geographical Importance Indian Navy*	Geographical regions identified by the Ministry of External Affairs, GoI, about SAGAR**
India's coastal areas and all other maritime areas which fall under the sovereignty of GoI, including EEZ and Continental shelf Regions, including the Arabian Sea, bay of Bengal, Andaman Sea and their littoral regions Persian Gulf region and its littoral Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea and their littoral Southwest Indian Ocean, East Coast of Africa and their littoral Choke points that are leading to, from and across the Indian Ocean Protection of SLOCs, vital energy and resource interests	Immediate neighbourhood (South Asia) identified through Neighbourhood first policy The southeast region identified through Act East Policy West Asian region, including Think West Policy Central Asia region through Connect Central Asia policy SAGAR Indian Ocean Region Indo-Pacific Safety and security of the Indian Ocean, along with, Enhancing economic and commercial cooperation

Source: \*Indian Maritime Security Strategy, Ministry of External Affairs, Indian Navy 2015, p-32

\*\* Foreign Policies of Government, Ministry of External Affairs, GoI, 2023

India's intensified interaction with the world, especially in the globalised world, prompted it to diversify its diplomatic and trade links with the rest of the world. As its interactions intensify, the areas of interest and regions would correspondingly evolve. The areas mentioned above of interest reveal that in the contemporary era, MEA's and Indian Navy's priority lists align with each other in exploring India's maritime world. Hence, one can say that "India's Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) increasingly views the IN as a tool of its diplomatic outreach" (Limaye, 2017).

### India in Global South

Many scholars opine that 21<sup>st</sup>-century India reprioritised its worldview and abandoned the Non-Alignment Movement Policy. However, India still has the spirit of NAM to represent the third world (the contemporary Global South region). India is a natural leader of the developing world, a title India has held since the 1940s. India's legacy of raising its voice on behalf of the large majority of states in the world continues through various platforms,

and its attempt to emerge as a leader of the Global South continues that trend. India intensified its attempt to magnify its role as an emerging leader of the Global South, especially in the context of its G-20 Presidency. However, it is challenging to represent the voice of the Global South as it is a universe of diverse voices and aspirations. Hence, it is challenging to place a common agenda to represent the states that represent the Global South. For example, states align either with India or China on matters of trade and commerce. The states that are more enthusiastic about exploring trade and opportunistic in advancing with investment options will be attracted by China; on the other hand, states that are interested in negotiating with the existing international financial institutions and world order would prefer to stay with India.

Standard parallels can be drawn between India's commitment and the nature of the Global South:

- (i) India's commitment to international world order has been known to the world since its independence
- (ii) India's commitment to a rule-based order
- (iii) India's continuous effort to reform the existing international financial institutions and its opposition to discriminated trade regulations
- (iv) India's long-term demand to reform the UN, including the Security Council

These aspirations of India go hand in hand with the fundamental nature of the Global South:

- (i) Their shared historical background and commitment to establishing an equitable world order for all the states
- (ii) The regions remained under-represented in international platforms, including their demand to reform UN Security Council
- (iii) Under-representation in international financial institutions
- (iv) Their opposition to discriminatory trade practices of the advanced west

India conducted a series of Voice of Global South meetings in January 2023 and November 2023 to frame the agenda for the G-20 summit. Consequently, India emerged confident in presenting the world regarding the demands of the Global South.

### **Multilateral Maritime Exercise: Complementing the Foreign Policy Aspirations**

The discussion mentioned above shares an idea that contemporary India's foreign policy aspirations are reprioritised in a globalised world, and the debate can be comprehended as;

India's maritime strategy document (2015) emphasised increased maritime cooperation and coordination among multiple agencies in India and with friendly states (Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2015, p. 5). The discussion above comprehends three central ideas;

- (i) In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, India's economic activities have expanded significantly.
- (ii) Many of these economic activities are connected with its oceanic world: the Indian Ocean.
- (iii) Contemporary India's attempt to assert its role as a natural leader of the Global South.

India's enhanced economic activities forced it to venture into the maritime world as a significant portion of its trade and commerce is sea-borne. This has happened due to the following reasons:

- (i) India's unique maritime geography with its central location
- (ii) Its location astride the critical Sea Lanes of Communication
- (iii) Its role as an emerging naval power
- (iv) The emerging significance of the Indian Ocean in international politics

Hence, the Maritime economy plays a significant role in India's national interests.

### **India's Sea-borne Trade**

Around ten years before, India was the 10th largest economy in the world, with a GDP of US \$ 1.9 trillion at current market value (The Hindu, 2024). Government of India's Economic Affairs Department states that "India is expected to become the third largest economy in the world with a GDP of US \$ 5 trillion" (Department of Economic Affairs, 2024, p. 63). Its maritime sector plays a significant role in its overall trade; nearly 80 per cent of the country's crude oil is imported via the international Sea Line in the Indian Ocean, and 11 per cent of offshore national crude oil requirement is also met from this oceanic world, thus, India's cumulative sea dependence for oil is estimated about 93 per cent (Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2015, p. 25). "More than 90% of India's international trade by volume and over 70% by value is carried over by the seas" (Sagarmala Press Release, 2015) (Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2015, p. 24).

### **Proximity with International Ship Lanes (ISLs)**

International Ship Lanes are the global ship transit route through the maritime world. Sea Lines of Communications are the channels through which states connect with the rest of the world for their maritime trade and commerce. The importance of SLOCs varies in different countries

depending upon factors like (a) the dependency of a state on maritime routes and (ii) the geographical location of a state. India's unique geographical location gifted the state with lengthy coastal areas and several ports. It has 12 major and 200 non-major ports on its western and eastern sides; these major ports work as arteries of the Indian economy that connect India with the rest of the world economies. This is known as Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs). During peacetime, SLOCs coincide with International Shipping Lanes (ISLs). Hence, the safety and security of these SLOCs and ISLs are significant for India as they stand for sustained growth and development.

### **India's Maritime Trade and Its Maritime Strategy**

Based on the discussion above, India's maritime strategy to pursue a secure and safe sea for all falls in tandem with its national interest. The same idea is reflected in the latest Voice of Global South Summit 2023, "Together, For everyone's growth, with everyone's Trust" (Ministry of External Affairs, 2023). The same spirit is also reflected in contemporary India's foreign policy dogma "Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR). Hence, two inferences can be made from the discussion mentioned above:

- (I) The abundance of India's maritime trade shapes its maritime strategy.
- (II) Its geographical location astride the International Shipping Lines (ISLs)

Thus, India's maritime strategy is highly influenced by its overseas trade, which forced it to protect itself against various sea-borne threats. The Indian Navy, being the responsible agency, ventures into its oceanic world to protect the nation's core interests. At this juncture, India's multilateral maritime exercises can be identified as a strategy employed by the Indian Navy's peacetime strategy to ensure secure seas so that its maritime trade with core regions would not suffer in the future.

### **India's Trading Partners**

Apart from the USA and China, India's first and second trading partners, respectively, were countries of the Arab Gulf, which maintained their status as the largest oil exporters to the Indian economy. Crude oil is India's biggest imported commodity, and Russia, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and UAE remain its largest oil exporters. Till October 2023, India imported crude oil worth \$182 billion.

GCC is India's largest regional-bloc trading partner, and trade with this bloc comprises 15.8 per cent of India's total trade in the FY 2022-23. Trade with the European Union is 11.6 per cent for the same year. During 2022, India achieved a record high of US \$ 100 billion in intra-BRICS trade; India exported US \$ 9.72 billion of products during 2022 to Brazil and imported



US \$ 6.4 billion. India's bilateral trade with South Africa amounted to US \$ 20 billion in 2022 (Devonshire-Ellis, 2023). Further, regarding its bilateral trade, the African Union (AU) is India's other largest trading partner after the US, China and UAE (Goyal, 2023). States like Mauritius and Seychelles in the South West Indian Ocean (SWIO) also found a significant place in India's investment sector; there is a massive flow of FDI from India to these regions, and more than 100 Indian companies are actively operating in these regions. Again, "India and ASEAN registered a bilateral trade of US\$ 131.5 billion in 2022-23, which accounted for 11.3 per cent of India's global trade for the same financial year (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2023).

From the discussion mentioned above, it is clear that India's trade flow is somewhat tilted towards the west of the Indian Ocean, where lies the GCC bloc, AU, two major partners of BRICS-Barzil and South Africa, and a significant presence of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) like Mauritius and Seychelles. Hence, a region called the South West Indian Ocean plays an important part in India's economic interests, which form part of contemporary India's national policy.

Hence, the security of ISLs and all SLOCs is a prime concern for India; in this context, the Indian Navy identified major choke points leading to and leaving the Indian Ocean as significant in this regard. Identifying a list of choke points in the Indian Ocean is a corollary to supporting India's economic and strategic security interests in the Indian Ocean.

As mentioned earlier, the discussion also points to the fact that states from the Global South account for many of India's trading partners. Hence, following inferences can be drawn:

Firstly, India's economic interest forms one of the state's core interests. Secondly, States from the global south account for much of India's trading partners and thirdly, India's economic ties are somewhat tilted towards South West of the Indian Ocean in the contemporary period

### **India's Joint Maritime Exercises**

South West of the Indian Ocean is one of the busiest Oceanic routes in the world. Most of the choke points also lie in this region. Hence, the Indian Navy is tasked with engaging the friendly states in the area to ensure a peaceful, secure and safe Indian Ocean. Multilateral Maritime exercises of the Indian Navy are employed as a peacetime force build-up. Such exercises aim "to provide operational exposure to our Naval forces, enhance interpretability, mutual exchange of best practices, special operations tactics, and to develop cooperation among the armed forces of participating nations, etc." (Ministry of Defence, 2021). The following is a list of maritime exercises India conducted in 2023.

*Sources: Ministry of Defence (2023),*

Table 2 List of Maritime Exercises 2023

Sl.No	Name of the Maritime exercise	Name of the Country
1	Malabar Exercise	India and the US
2	Exercise Al-Mohed-Al Hindi	India and Saudi Arabia
3	Exercise SALVEX	India and the US
4	Exercise Varuna	India and France (on the western seaboard in the Arabian Sea)
5	SLINEX-23	India and Sri Lanka
6	SIMBEX-23	India and Singapore
7	AFINEX-23	India and South Africa
8	HADR Exercise (CHAKRAVARTY-23)	India, Comoros, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Sri Lanka and Tanzania
9	BONGOSAGAR-23	India and Bangladesh
10	Exercise Ayutthaya	India and Thailand
11	AIME-23	India and ASEAN
12	JIMEX-23	India and Japan
13	Exercise Samudra Shakti	India and Indonesia

<https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1950870>,

<https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1927721>,

<https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1937685>

<https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1891610>,

<https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1913503>,

<https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1962396>

<https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1911766>

<https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1965929>

<https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1976149>

<https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1996344>

<https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1921224>

The list mentioned above of India's bilateral and multilateral maritime exercises shows that India conducts maritime exercises with most of the littoral states in the Indian Ocean. A large majority of these groups fall in the category of the Global South, and India shares an abundance of its trade interaction with these states as well. Hence, the Indian Navy must ensure a safe and secure Indian Ocean. Regular maritime exercises with friendly states in the Indian Ocean help the Indian Navy to employ acquired knowledge and training from such maritime exercises. Maritime exercises help its Navy address the challenges of piracy, terrorism, and Human and Drug trafficking. Indian Navy's (2015) document explains its multifaceted

role and tasks in the Indian Ocean: (i) Military, (ii) Diplomatic, (iii) Constabulary, and (iii) Benign; objectives of these roles are to protect India's maritime world, "safeguard India's mercantile marine and maritime trade, strengthen political relations and goodwill, portray credible deterrence posture, maritime assistance and support, coordinated patrol, peace enforcement, counter-armed threats, including piracy, terrorism and trafficking, provision of relief materials, and supplies, and project national soft power" (Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2015, p. 78).

Indian Navy's power projection in the southwest Indian Ocean has intensified in the last couple of years; it actively engaged in (The Guardian, 2024) (Unjhwala, 2024):

- (i) It undertakes missions to rescue hijacked ships in the Indian Ocean
- (ii) It rescued commercial ships hit by Houthi drone attacks in 2024
- (iii) Thwarted various piracy attempts
- (iv) Investigated a large number of fishing vessels
- (v) Constant patrolling in the Indian Ocean
- (vi) Ensure the safety of merchant shipping and seafarers

The success of these missions primarily results from several joint military exercises that the Indian Navy conducted in this region with friendly nations and coordinated exercises of the Indian Navy and Air Force. Exposure to such exercises equipped the Indian Navy with the following;

- (i) Interoperability
- (ii) Operational readiness at the time of crisis
- (iii) Familiarise with different regions of the Indian Ocean
- (iv) Quick access and support from friendly states with whom such joint operations are conducted.

Thus, India's joint maritime exercises proved effective in "synergising actions in the maritime domain with other stakeholders" (Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2015, p. 5). In a recent episode, the Indian Navy tracked and rescued a hijacked commercial ship which has been used as a pirate ship. In this operation, the Indian Navy demonstrated its newly acquired capability to drop Marine Commandos (MARCOS) with the coordination of the Indian Air Force. Thus, they safely returned the ship to the original country. By engaging in such operations, the Indian Navy asserted that no country could assert dominance over its friendly states and threaten their sovereignty (Unjhwala, 2024). Thus, the Indian Navy also acts as a provider of public goods in the Indian Ocean. Delivery of such public goods can be ensured only when we maintain a rule-based order at sea.

In the contemporary period, the Indian Navy engaged in various anti-piracy operations across the Indian Ocean. In addition to that, its rescue missions are also appreciated by the international community. The interoperability capacity that the Indian Navy attained through various maritime exercises helped it to tackle such a crisis. Thus, the strategy of deterrence employed by the Indian Navy, especially its collaborations with friendly foreign nations, transformed into a positive deterrence strategy; it includes- constant surveillance, patrolling, anti-piracy, anti-trafficking, relief provisions, and rescue missions. These peacetime roles of the Indian Navy thus act as a net security provider to the Indian Ocean region, in addition to its military role as a force capable enough to render deterrence against conflict and coercion.

### Conclusion

Indian Navy's role as a public goods provider in the Indian Ocean impacted its relations with littoral states in the region, which was well reflected in the participation of 125 states from the Global South in the voice of Global Summit, including many from the Indian Ocean Region. Because India believes that intensified maritime cooperation and coordination across multiple agencies in India with friendly nations would further develop and

Indian Navy	Ministry of External Affairs
Cooperation and Coordination at the Sea Rule-based Order at the Sea	Cooperation and co-existence Support to International institutions However, with an agenda proposing such institutions (the UN and International financial institutions) need to be reformed.

enhance its role. Thus, it reflects the following idea:

In general, contemporary India project ideas like (i) cooperation and coordination and (ii) rule-based system

These principles are also reflected in India's interaction with the rest of the world. India supports the existing world order, ensuring a rule-based order among the Comity of Nations. However, India, being a state that belongs to the Global South, realises that the existing rule-based order needs to be reformed to accommodate the genuine interests of the Global South. Thus, there is a consonance with the Indian Navy's pursuing idea: cooperation and coordination, rule-based order in the Oceanic world and India's national policy of cooperation and co-existence with a vigour to reform the existing international institution by adhering to its principles.

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